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JURISDICTION AND CASE HISTORY 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i), as this matter is an 
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil action in 
which the Third District Court granted defendants* motions for 
summary judgment and motion for protective order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was it error for the district court to enter summary 
judgment against the Hotels on their claim that the Innkeeper 
License Tax created an improper tax classification such that 
its operation is discriminatory, arbitrary and an abuse of 
taxing power, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 and 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Was it error for the district court to issue a 
protective order prohibiting discovery of the amount of taxes 
paid by Innkeepers to Salt Lake City on the basis that such 
information is irrelevant to the issues in this case? 
3. Was it error for the district court to enter summary 
judgment against the Hotels on their claim that the Innkeeper 
License Tax is an illegal sales or income tax? 
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CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES k RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1: 
****No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7: 
Sect. 7 [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 (1986): 
License fees and taxes. 
They may raise revenue by levying and 
collecting a license fee or tax on any 
business within the limits of the city, and 
regulate the same by ordinance; provided, 
that no Utah city or town shall collect a 
license fee or tax hereunder from any 
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains 
orders for or sells goods in such city or 
town solely for resale; and no enumeration 
of powers of cities contained in this 
chapter, shall be deemed to limit or 
restrict the general grant of authority 
hereby conferred. All such license fees and 
taxes shall be uniform in respect to the 
class upon which they are imposed. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-31-1 through 6 (1987) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-301, 302 (supp. 1987) 
See Exhibit 7 of Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a challenge to Salt Lake City's 
Innkeeper License Tax (hereinafter "Innkeeper Tax"), adopted in 
June, 1982, which imposes a license tax of one percent of gross 
revenues for rental of rooms to persons for less than 30 days. 
(R. 5-7, 228 and Addendum, Exhibit 1.) The appellants are 
Little America Hotel Corporation (hereinafter "LAHCO") and Utah 
Hotel Company ("Hotel Utah") who will be referred to jointly 
herein as "Hotels". The complaints of the Hotels, which were 
amended and consolidated by the courts below, allege that the 
Innkeeper Tax imposes substantial additional tax liability on 
the Hotels and on the entire class subject to the Innkeeper Tax 
(hereinafter referred to as "Innkeepers"). It is alleged that 
the Innkeeper Tax adds a tax burden to Innkeepers in addition 
to taxes already paid by them, which would be grossly 
disproportionate to any municipal services and benefits 
received by them from Salt Lake City (hereinafter "SLC"). 
Hotels allege the ordinance to be unconstitutional, void, and 
ultra vires under the United States and Utah Constitutions and 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 for failing to operate 
uniformly all persons similarly situated. It is alleged that 
the Innkeeper Tax is arbitrary and discriminatory. Hotel Utah 
further alleges that the power to impose a gross receipts tax 
on Innkeepers has been statutorily delegated to the counties, 
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is beyond the authority of SLC, and that the tax is illegal as 
being a tax on income, or a sales tax. (R.939-951.) (The 
various amended complaints and orders of consolidation are 
found at R. 2-4, 19-21, 878-83, 890-902, 906-912, 939-51, 
987-95, 997-98, 1113-24, 1145-57, 1160-61, 1238-52, 1292-95.) 
Hotel Utah and SLC filed cross motions for summary 
judgment. Both SLC and LAHCO filed affidavits with regard to 
the motion for summary judgment. (R.137-242, R.284-380, 
R800-834o) Thereafter, the trial court entered its Memorandum 
Decision. (R.913-917 and Addendum, Exhibit 2.) The court, 
determining that summary judgment on most issues would be 
appropriate, stated: 
The court finds in favor of the Defendants 
and against the Plaintiffs on all legal 
issues raised by the pleadings and Motions, 
together with those suggested in the 
supporting Memoranda, with the exception of 
the issue of "classification" and whether or 
not such a classification is arbitrary 
and/or discriminatory. A determination of 
the issue of the reasonableness of the 
classification under the circumstances of 
this case must be based on the facts as they 
may eventually be found by a trier of fact. 
(R. 915) 
The Court found that the affidavits made clear that issues of 
fact remain for resolution at trial on the classification 
issue. (R.915.) Thereafter, the Court entered its Judgment on 
Motions for Summary Judgment, which stated: 
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All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed 
with prejudice, excepting only the issue of 
the legality of tax classification of the 
city ordinance subject of the within dispute 
and whether or not such classification is 
arbitrary and/or discriminatory as applied. 
(R.924-25.) 
In order to obtain information regarding the taxes paid by 
Innkeepers to SLC, LAHCO subpoenaed the records of UP&L with 
regard to the utility franchise taxes paid by Innkeepers. It 
requested summary data according to a group of motels and not 
information as to any one customer. (R.1080-1081 and Addendum, 
Exhibit 3.) After a hearing, the Court entered its Memorandum 
Decision (R.1135-38, and Addendum, Exhibit 4), and stated: 
Whether or not the benefits received by the 
plaintiff from the defendant bears any 
relationship to the taxes paid is not an 
issue that remains for determination. The 
Court's prior ruling on the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment encompassed such 
a claim, and by this Memorandum any 
ambiguity contained in either the Memorandum 
decision or the subsequent Order signed by 
the Court is resolved. The only remaining 
issue is whether or not the tax 
classification in question is arbitrary 
and/or discriminatory as applied. 
(R.1136-37.) 
Following the Memorandum Decision, the Court entered its 
Order Clarifying Partial Summary Judgment and Granting 
Protective Order, which granted a protective order against the 
information sought from UP&L and clarified the earlier partial 
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Summary Judgment ruling as stated in the Court's Memorandum 
decision. (R.1141-43.) Thereafter, LAHCO admitted in answers 
to interrogatories that it had "no evidence that the ordinance 
has been arbitrarily applied or discriminatorily applied, with 
the understanding that those terms mean that the ordinance was 
applied to LAHCO and not other members of the class subject to 
the tax imposed by the ordinance," i.e., other Innkeepers. 
(R.1208.) Thereafter, SLC again made Motion for Summary 
Judgment on all remaining issues, which was granted by the 
Court on July 7, 1987. (R.1296-98.) 
In addition to the preceding procedural history, the 
following are the relevant facts as shown by the record in the 
court below: 
1. In June, 1982, the Salt Lake City Council passed an 
ordinance imposing a special license tax on Innkeepers (the 
"Innkeeper Tax") in the amount of one percent of the gross 
revenue derived from rental of rooms for less than 30 days. 
Section 20-3-15, Salt Lake City Ordinances. (R 5-7, 228 and 
Addendum, Exhibit 1.) The Innkeeper Tax was first proposed at 
a rate of 3% of such revenues. (R.469.) License taxes for all 
other businesses in Salt Lake City, except public utilities, 
are charged at the rate of $50.00 per place of business, plus 
$5.00 per employee. (Section 20-3-2, Salt Lake City 
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Ordinances, R.221). All license taxes are imposed for general 
revenue purposes of the City. (Salt Lake City Ordinances, 
Section 20-3-12.3, R.224.) 
2. If LAHCO were subject to the license tax rate applied 
to other businesses in SLC, it would pay a yearly tax of 
$5,107. If the Innkeeper Tax had been imposed in 1981, it 
would have imposed a total tax on LAHCO of more than $119,000. 
This represents a 2,300 percent increase in the license tax 
over the amount that would otherwise be paid by LAHCO. Had it 
been in effect in 1981, the Innkeeper Tax would have increased 
taxes paid by LAHCO to SLC for the Little America Hotel by 42% 
overall. (Affidavit of Merrill Norman, R.810-834, at 818 and 
Addendum, Exhibit 5.) The Innkeeper Tax is collected in 
addition to sales tax, property tax, utility franchise tax, and 
the 3% transient room tax already imposed by county government 
and paid by Innkeepers and their guests. (Id., R.817, 824.) 
3. In considering the impact of the Innkeeper Tax, SLC 
administrative personnel compared the sales, property and 
franchise taxes paid by residents to sales taxes paid by 
visitors to the City. (Exhibit 2-J to Defendant's answers to 
LAHCO's First Set of Interrogatories, R.444.) However, since 
the purpose of the comparison is to determine the fairness of 
the tax on Innkeepers by considering the effect of such a tax 
when passed through to their guests, the taxes paid by 
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Innkeepers relating to these visitors' Salt Lake City 
residences (the Hotels and Motels) should also be considered. 
(Norman Affidavit, Paragraph 21, R.817.) When these figures 
are also included, it is apparent that taxes paid by enough 
LAHCO guests to account for a total of one year in the city by 
one person (a resident equivalent) is $317.00, compared to 
$130o00 per resident, without considering the additional taxes 
raised by the Innkeeper Tax. The Innkeeper Tax adds an 
additional $139.00 to that tax burden. (id.) These figures do 
not include the transient room tax imposed by Salt Lake County 
pursuant to statutory authority, which adds an additional 
$418.00 per resident equivalent to the tax burden. SLC taxed 
Innkeepers and their guests more heavily than other businesses 
and residents even before the imposition of the Innkeeper Tax. 
(id.) 
4. As justification for the Innkeeper Tax, SLC attempted 
to establish that Innkeepers taxed by the ordinance 
(a) received the benefit of more city services and 
expenditures, or (b) cost the city more money than other 
businesses, residents, or property owners. (Affidavit of Lewis 
E. Miller, R.189-191; Affidavit of E.L. "Bud" Willoughby, 
R.199-201; and Affidavit of Peter O. Pederson, R.195-98.) SLC 
made no attempt to relate these factors to the amount of tax 
imposed. There is also evidence in the record contradictory to 
the statements in these affidavits. 
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5. In his affidavit, Police Chief Bud Willoughby 
expressed the opinion that the transient nature of hotel and 
motel guests renders them susceptible to a high degree of 
criminal activity. (R.200.) LAHCO, however, provides its own 
security force at an annual expense of nearly $100,000, which 
performs police functions on the premises. (Affidavit of Glen 
Robbins, R.800-802.) In 1981, the police were called to LAHCO 
191 times, while the total calls to the Salt Lake Police 
Department in 1981 were 114,380. When averaged over the total 
resident and work force population of LAHCO and SLC, the number 
of calls to police from LAHCO were fewer than that of SLC in 
general, per capita. (Norman Affidavit, paragraph 12 and 
Exhibit 1, R.814-821.) 
6. The affidavit of Fire Chief Peter O. Pederson stated 
that the unique nature of hotels and motels imposes unusual 
costs on the City because they commonly are multiple-story 
structures and consist of high density residential 
accommodations. (R.196-197.) Yet the Innkeeper Tax is imposed 
on all Innkeepers regardless of building height. Of the total 
number of units subject to the tax, 59% are structures of six 
floors or less. (Affidavit of Sue Wo1ley, R.803-809, at 809.) 
Also, hotels in Salt Lake City account for only 11.5% of the 
total floor space of high-rise buildings in Salt Lake City 
(higher than 5 floors) and there are many more high-rise 
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residential apartments and condominiums than hotels. (Norman 
Affidavit, paragraph 8 and Exhibit 6, R.816, 826-27.) Based on 
population and taxes paid, LAHCO and its guests already pay for 
more than a proportionate share of the costs of fire protection 
without considering the Innkeeper Tax. (Norman Affidavit, 
paragraph 20, and Exhibit 7, R. 816-17, 828.) 
7. In addition to the security protection it provides for 
itself, LAHCO also provides other services, such as garbage 
service, street and sidewalk cleaning which normally are 
performed by SLC for city residents. LAHCO has purchased 
garbage trucks costing more than $90,000, has paid more than 
$14,000 per year for employees to run the trucks and haul 
garbage, and has paid more than $14,000 per year in landfill 
fees, plus $200 per month for operating the trucks. (Affidavit 
of Glen Robbins, R. 800-02.) 
8. SLC also opines that the Salt Lake City Airport with 
its recent $80 million expansion "uniquely benefits" Innkeepers 
(Affidavit of Louis Miller, R. 190.) The ordinance at issue in 
this case, however, raises taxes for the city's general fund. 
The Salt Lake City Airport is run under a separate Enterprise 
Fund, and no money passes from the general fund (including 
revenues of the Innkeeper Tax) to the airport. None of the $80 
million airport expansion came from the SLC general funds. 
(Norman Affidavit, Paragraphs 5-10, R. 812-813.) 
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LAHCO was prevented from expanding the information 
contained in the Affidavit of Merrill Norman from LAHCO itself 
to encompass all Innkeepers because of the trial court's 
protective order ruling that any information about taxes paid 
or their comparison to benefits received is not a relevant 
factual issue. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A Utah city's license taxes are subject to the 
statutory requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 that they be 
"uniform in respect to the class upon which they are imposed" 
and are also subject to the equal protection requirements of 
the Utah Constitution's due process clause of Article I, 
Section 7. Prior Utah Supreme Court cases regarding the 
legality of license taxes subject to these requirements 
establish that the test of legality of a license tax is whether 
the class subject to the tax includes all persons similarly 
situated and whether the class bears a reasonable relation to 
the purposes to be accomplished by the tax. The application of 
this test requires a court to consider all circumstances under 
which the ordinance was enacted and would operate. 
2. Facts in the record through affidavits and discovery 
created a genuine issue of material fact respecting whether 
transient visitors to SLC impose greater burdens on city 
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government than city residents or whether they pay less tax to 
SLC per resident equivalent than do SLC residents—the grounds 
on which SLC justified singling out Innkeepers for taxation. 
Despite this factual dispute, the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment and ruling that the question of legality of 
the classification is a matter of law to be determined without 
regard to the factual circumstances, and that SLC may legally 
tax Innkeepers separately, on a different basis -- and at a 
much higher rate -- than other businesses, regardless of the 
factual circumstances involved, merely because Innkeepers can 
be described as a separate class. 
3. The district court erred in its ruling that evidence 
of other taxes paid by Innkeepers to SLC is irrelevant to the 
issue of legality of the Innkeeper Tax, and in prohibiting 
discovery of that information. Because the Innkeeper Tax 
raises general operating revenues for SLC, the test of legality 
of the tax requires a consideration of whether factual 
circumstances show a reasonable relation between the choice to 
levy a special tax only on Innkeepers and the general revenue 
needs of SLC. 
4. Although SLC characterized the Innkeeper Tax as a 
"license tax", it bears no functional resemblance to typical 
municipal license taxes. Rather than being a fixed charge 
assessed against someone operating a business as a precondition 
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to engaging in that particular business, it is measured by and 
assessed against particular transactions between the business 
and its customers—very similar in operation to a sales tax. 
Like an income tax, it is periodically assessed against the 
receipts or income of the business as distinguished from the 
business itself, and is collected apart from business license 
fees. SLC has exhausted its power to impose sales taxes 
through its imposition of other pre-existing levies; and SLC, 
like all other Utah municipalities, is not lawfully empowered 
to impose and collect an income tax. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF FACTUAL 
ISSUES ABOUT THE REASONABLENESS OF THE SPECIAL TAX AGAINST 
INNKEEPERS FOR GENERAL REVENUE PURPOSES 
A. The Innkeeper Tax is Illegally Discriminatory if it 
Unreasonably Limits the Class Taxed to Innkeepers 
Only. The Tax is Unreasonable if it Fails to Include 
Others Similarly Situated and the Class Taxed Bears no 
Reasonable Relation to Raising Revenue. 
The most recent Utah case on point with the issues 
raised in this case is Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979)(hereinafter 
"Farmington"). In that case, this Court held that a Farmington 
City license tax on "amusements," which would only apply to 
Lagoon and possibly to the Oakridge Country Club, was invalid 
as being in violation of the requirements and protections of 
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Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-80, and the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that: 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 is the legislative grant of power to 
the cities to enact license tax ordinances for the purposes of 
regulating or raising revenue. That statute requires that: 
All such license fees and taxes shall be 
uniform in respect to the class upon which 
they are imposed. 
In Farmington, the tax imposed was 2 percent of gross 
revenues. Its only purpose was to produce revenue. In 
interpreting the above constitutional and statutory provisions, 
the Court noted that legislative judgment and discretion in 
municipal taxation is entitled to great deference. Yet the 
Court went on as follows: 
Such deference, however, does not allow 
unfettered discretion. U.C.A., 1953, 
10-8-80 requires that 'all such license fees 
and taxes shall be uniform in respect to the 
class upon which they are imposed.* Nor is 
the municipal corporation at liberty to 
arbitrarily define a 'class' for taxation 
and then claim to tax it uniformly; such an 
approach would not only totally emasculate 
the effect of the uniformity provision, but 
would fall wide of the constitutional 
requirements of equal protection and due 
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process. A valid classification, for 
statutory and constitutional purposes, must 
include all persons similarly situated, and 
must bear a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act. 
Where some persons or transactions excluded 
from the operation of the law are, as to its 
subject matter, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, the 
law is discriminatory in the sense of being 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
Id., at 1245 (emphasis added). 
In Farmington, this Court construed the due process 
protections of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution as 
having an equal protection aspect which prohibits arbitrary 
classification for tax purposes. At least this is true for 
taxes which are also subject to the uniformity requirements 
imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80. In applying that standard 
to the Farmington amusement tax, this Court stated: "Whenever 
a class is singled out for taxation, the amount of which is 
unduly burdensome, the question of abuse of taxing power is 
raised. " Id.. , at 1246. 
Previous Utah cases have held ordinances to be 
unconstitutional which levied taxes on one class of taxpayers 
even though its members were numerous. In Weber Basin Home 
Builders' Association v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 
(1971), Roy City had imposed an increase from $12.00 to $112.00 
for a building permit fee for a single family dwelling, and 
argued that Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 authorized such a fee. In 
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that case, as in this one, the purpose of the ordinance was to 
raise revenue for the city's general fund. The Court 
specifically stated that the fee must be analyzed as a tax. 
Id., 26 Utah 2d at 217, 487 P.2d at 86. The Court stated that 
a license tax "cannot be imposed in any such manner as to 
violate constitutional principles, which include equal and 
nondiscriminatory treatment and protection under the law." 
Id., 26 Utah 2d at 218, 487 P.2d at 86. 
The test to be applied was described as follows: 
The critical question here is whether the 
ordinance in its practical operation results 
in an unjust discrimination by imposing a 
greater burden of the cost of city 
government on one class of persons as 
compared to another without any proper basis 
for such differentiation and classification. 
Id. 
Orem City v. Pyne, 16 Utah 2d 355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965), 
involved a criminal complaint for failure to pay Orem's 
business license tax, authority for which was claimed to be 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80. The district court had found that 
tax to be unreasonable and discriminatory and had dismissed the 
complaint. This Court affirmed, referring to and adopting the 
opinion of the district judge, Judge Harding. The license tax 
in that case, just as SLC has done with its license tax on 
other businesses and on Innkeepers, placed some businesses on a 
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flat fee basis and others on a percentage of gross revenues 
basis. A copy of Judge Harding's decision is Exhibit 6 to the 
Addendum. It states at page 4: 
To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a 
reasonable classification of businesses 
generally for taxation and fix a tax rate 
therefore based on gross sales with certain 
minimum and maximum amounts, and by another 
section of the same ordinance exclude from 
the operation of Section 3, certain 
businesses naturally falling within its 
classification, and apply to such excluded 
businesses a tax rate on a flat annual basis 
that can not possibly be more than the 
minimum for the unexcluded businesses is 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory. Such exclusion assures to 
the excluded businesses a concession not 
accorded to other businesses similarly 
situated. 
Utah's watershed case in this field is Cache County v. 
Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900), in which a county 
ordinance set a license fee on those engaged in the business of 
sheepherding. The purpose of the ordinance was to raise 
revenue, not to regulate the sheep industry. Commenting that 
"The law abhors inequality and lack of uniformity in taxation, 
whether the burden be imposed by license or by levy and 
assessment," id.., 21 Utah at 224, 61 P. at 307, this Court held 
the license tax on sheepherders to be illegal. The legislature 
had not granted counties the power to levy license taxes for 
revenue purposes. Further, a tax only on sheepherders was so 
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unequal and oppressive as to be prohibited by the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. On the latter issue, this Court 
stated: 
When it is considered that such a power of 
taxation would be in the hands of but a few 
men in each county, whose actions might 
proceed from prejudice towards a particular 
business, from favoritism or animosity, or 
from other improper motives or influences, 
easy of concealment and difficult of 
detection, it becomes unnecessary to suggest 
the injustice which might be done under the 
cover of the power, because that becomes 
apparent upon a moment's reflection. Under 
such a power, as is contended for by counsel 
for the respondent, the sheep industry, or 
one particular industry, in some of the 
counties of this commonwealth, might be 
taxed for more than the cost of maintaining 
the government, to the practical exemption 
of all other kinds of business from 
contributing their share of the burden. 
Private rights cannot thus be arbitrarily 
invaded or annihilated, under the mere guise 
of a license. One class of citizens cannot 
thus be compelled to bear the burden of 
government, to the advantage of all other 
classes. The law, as we have seen, will not 
permit it. Neither the constitution nor the 
statute authorizes boards of county 
commissioners to enact ordinances, as in 
this instance, to tax the citizens 
arbitrarily and unjustly by license which 
confers no privilege that was not previously 
enjoyed, and which has no view to regulation. 
Id., 21 Utah at 227, 61 P. at 308 (emphasis added). 
These Utah cases establish that the test of the 
constitutionality and legality of the Innkeeper Tax at issue 
here, as regards the discrimination issues, is whether the 
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classification of Innkeepers as the only taxpayers includes all 
persons similarly situated, and bears a reasonable relation to 
the general revenue raising purposes to be accomplished by the 
tax. 
B. The Issue of Reasonableness of Classification Involves 
Controverted Questions of Fact. 
In Farmington, supra, the amusement license tax 
imposed on Lagoon was found to be unconstitutional and illegal 
after a trial of the facts, which brought out evidence of the 
history of Farmington's taxation of Lagoon, of the services 
provided to that business by the city, of the services and 
improvements Lagoon provided for itself, and of the city's 
needs. On appeal, "Farmington does not challenge the trial 
court's findings of fact. It requests that we reverse the 
finding of unconstitutionality and illegality 'as a matter of 
law'". Id., at 1244. 
After setting out the test for compliance with the 
statutory and constitutional provisions (quoted supra at page 
15), this Court stated: 
The issue in the present case, then, may be 
reduced to an inquiry whether or not the 
licensing ordinance passed by Farmington and 
assessed against Lagoon represents such an 
improper classification that, its operation 
becomes discriminatory, arbitrary, and an 
abuse of the taxing power. Such an inquiry 
must necessarily take into consideration all 
circumstances under which the ordinance was 
enacted and under which it would operate, 
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since reasonableness of classification 
cannot be determined by reference to a few 
well-chosen legal generalities, and a 
classification which is perfectly reasonable 
in one context and may be patently 
unreasonable in another. 
Id., at 1245 (emphasis added). 
This Court rejected Farmington City's suggestion that the 
case should have been decided as a matter of law. 
The holding in Farmington that the issue of reasonableness 
of classification involves issues of fact is supported by other 
Utah Supreme Court cases. In Weber Basin Home Builders 
Association vs. Roy City, supra, invalidating a $100.00 
increase in building permit fees, this Court looked to the 
facts to test the reasonableness of the classification: 
Under the undisputed facts as presented to 
the trial court: where the basic flat-fee 
charge for a building permit was increased 
in one jump from $12 to $112, which increase 
admittedly had no relationship to increased 
costs of the service rendered; and more 
importantly, where the declared purpose was 
to raise general revenue for the City, it 
was his opinion that the increase placed a 
disproportionate and unfair burden on new 
households in Roy City, as compared to the 
old ones, in the maintenance of the City 
government; and that conseguently it was 
discriminatory and unconstitutionally 
impermissible. We are not disposed to 
disagree with that conclusion. 
Id., 26 Utah 2d at 219, 487 P.2d at 869. 
This Court has also imposed a factual test of 
reasonableness in a similar situation. When a City imposes 
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connection fees for city services or subdivision fees, the test 
of the validity of these fees is one of reasonableness, whether 
the fees require newly develpped properties to bear more than 
their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to the 
benefits conferred. In Banberry Development Corp. v. South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), this Court held that 
"[t]he reasonableness of the dedication or cash requirement in 
a particular case was a question of fact that must be resolved 
at trial." Ld./ at 901, citing Call v. City of West Jordan, 
614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980). 
It is apparent that when Utah courts apply the state 
constitution and statutory provisions regarding uniformity and 
non-discrimination to a city's revenue-raising license taxes, 
the issue of the reasonableness of classification is one of 
fact to be decided by reference to all surrounding 
circumstances. 
It is appropriate as a policy matter, for the state 
constitution and law to require a reasonable basis in fact for 
classification, rather than asking if facts could be conceived 
which would justify the classification (which is the test for 
compliance with the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
When the Utah Legislature granted power to cities to raise 
revenues by license taxes, it determined to protect those who 
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could be taxed and expressed a policy of fairness and equality 
in taxation. This is expressed by the uniformity requirement 
of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80. The equal protection elements of 
the Utah Constitution also express that policy. This Court has 
recognized this policy in striking down discriminatory license 
taxes in the cases cited above. In Farmington, the city 
conceived a set of facts which would justify the tax. But 
because no such facts could be shown to exist, the ordinance 
failed. 
These cases are in the tradition of Utah law expressing and 
imposing a policy of equality and fairness in municipal 
taxation, well expressed in Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & 
Railway, 45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 (1914): 
Uniformity and equality, so far as those 
elements can be attained, are always to be 
the aim and guide of those upon whom is 
conferred the authority to impose or assess 
taxes. When once inequality is permitted, 
and it is established that the burden of 
taxation may be unequally distributed under 
governmental authority, the government 
permitting it becomes a farce and is 
entirely unworthy of either our respect or 
support. So long as the burdens of taxation 
are distributed equally, they cannot well 
become oppressive, since they are imposed 
upon those constituting the community at 
large, and the community as a whole always 
possesses the power to relieve itself in one 
way or another. When, however, the burdens 
are imposed upon only a part less than the 
majority or a smaller fraction, the burden 
may easily become destructive, and, if not 
destructive, at least unjustly oppressive. 
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Equality, therefore, becomes a safeguard 
against, if not an absolute prevention of, 
excessive and oppressive taxation. 
Id., 45 Utah at 63, 142 P. at 1071. 
Since this is an appeal of a Summary Judgment against the 
Hotels, this Court will consider the record in the light most 
favorable to the Hotels* position, resolving all doubts in 
favor of the Hotels. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. 
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
The Utah cases establish that the test for legality of 
license classification is whether there exists a reasonable 
basis in fact for the classification of those taxed which is 
related to the purpose of the tax and whether the tax applies 
to all those similarly situated. If this test is not met, the 
license tax is arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore 
illegal and unconstitutional. What factual circumstances could 
provide a reasonable basis for levying a tax on Innkeepers 
only? SLC understood this issue. It introduced affidavits 
stating opinions that Innkeepers place unusual burdens on the 
city, that they do not pay enough in taxes to cover the cost of 
city services and the benefits provided them. With regard to 
classifying Innkeepers as the only taxpaying entities, however, 
Hotels submit that no other ground could exist which could have 
a reasonable relation to the object of raising revenue. 
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There is, at the very least, a factual question as to 
whether such conditions exist. The analyses performed by 
Merrill Norman, LAHCO's expert accountant, show that Innkeepers 
and their guests pay more than their fair share of the cost of 
city government even without paying the Innkeeper Tax. The 
taxes paid for each resident-equivalent of LAHCO guests amount 
to $317.00 compared to the $130.00 paid by residents. That is 
without including the additional burden imposed by the 
Innkeeper Tax in the amount of $139 per resident equivalent per 
year. In addition, LAHCO and its guests draw on city services 
less than residents, while paying for a security force, 
providing garbage collection services, and street and sidewalk 
cleaning and maintenance, at a substantial cost. There are 
clearly issues of fact as to whether circumstances exist which 
might justify the imposition of a revenue-raising tax only on 
Innkeepers. The city's conclusory opinion evidence was not 
sufficient to preclude an investigation into these factual 
questions, in view of the significant countervailing evidence 
presented by the affidavits filed by LAHCO. 
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II. THE PROTECTIVE ORDER PREVENTING DISCOVERY OF TAXES PAID 
BY INNKEEPERS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE 
INFORMATION SOUGHT WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF THE 
REASONABLENESS OF TAXING ONLY INNKEEPERS. 
LAHCO sought by subpoena to obtain information about taxes 
paid by other Innkeepers to Salt Lake City. This included a 
subpoena to Utah Power & Light ("UP&L") for information 
regarding utility franchise taxes paid by Innkeepers. 
(Addendum, Exhibit 3) The trial court granted a protective 
order prohibiting LAHCO from obtaining such information, and 
issued its Order Clarifying Summary Judgment and Granting 
Protective Order, which stated that the issues remaining for 
determination do not include any comparison of taxes paid to 
benefits received. Under the test for reasonableness adopted 
by this Court in other cases, one issue is whether the class 
subject to the tax is similarly situated to those not taxed 
with regard to the purposes of the ordinance. The other issue 
is whether the class subject to the tax is related to the 
purpose of the ordinance. LAHCO submits that with regard to a 
revenue-raising tax, these issues really become one: Does the 
choice to tax only Innkeepers have a reasonable relation under 
the actual circumstances to the revenue-raising object of the 
ordinance? If there is a reasonable basis for taxing only 
Innkeepers for raising revenues, the ordinance would be valid. 
If there is no such reasonable basis, the ordinance is invalid. 
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One reason which might justify taxing only Innkeepers would 
be if they and their guests didn't already pay their fair share 
of taxes to SLC. Since other taxes paid for general revenue 
purposes are one of the circumstances in which the Innkeeper 
Tax would operate, the amount of taxes paid by the Innkeepers 
to SLC is relevant to determining whether, under the 
circumstances, the choice of taxing only Innkeepers is 
reasonably related to the revenue producing objective of the 
ordinance. This is why LAHCO and Hotel Utah believe that it 
was error for the district court to grant a protective order 
and to rule that such information is irrelevant. 
A court will overturn a trial court's protective order upon 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Bigler v. Bigler, 482 P.2d 
996 (Colo. App. 1971). The trial court's Protective Order in 
this case was based on a finding of irrelevancy. As this Court 
has held on prior occasions, "[i]n considering what is the 
'subject-matter* of a lawsuit we keep in mind that the ultimate 
objective of any lawsuit is a determination of the dispute 
between the parties; . . . Whatever helps attain that objective 
is 'relevant' to the lawsuit" within the meaning of Rule 26, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 
189, 191, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967). Because factual issues about 
the reasonableness of taxing only Innkeepers exist, the amount 
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of taxes paid by Innkeepers is relevant and discoverable, and 
it was an abuse of discretion to hold that data respecting 
other taxes paid by Innkeepers to SLC are irrelevant. 
III. CASES UPHOLDING TOURIST PROMOTION TAXES ON INNKEEPERS AND 
TAXES ON UTILITIES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE. 
This court has previously upheld the imposition by Salt 
Lake County of a transient room tax on Innkeepers. See Menlove 
v. Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 418 P.2d 227 (1966) 
(hereinafter "Menlove"). However, Menlove and the tax upheld 
therein are readily distinguishable from this case. 
First, the tax was expressly authorized by statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-31-1, et_ seq. (1987). The proceeds of the 
transient room tax reviewed in Menlove were required to be used 
only for the purposes of establishing, financing and promoting 
recreational, tourist and convention bureaus. This Court noted 
that fact. Id., 18 Utah 2d at 205, 418 P.2d at 228. The class 
taxed by each enactment may be the same, but the tax imposed is 
very much different. For one thing, proceeds of SLC's 
Innkeeper Tax are not designated for a special purpose, but are 
used for the City's general fund. This distinction is crucial. 
Part of the plaintiffs argument in Menlove was that the 
ordinance is invalid because the tax is levied only on a 
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particular group for the benefit of all businesses generally« 
This court stated that this argument 
is well answered in New York Rapid Transit 
Corporation v. City of New York. The City 
of New York levied an excise tax on every 
utility doing business in the city. The law 
specified that all revenues from the tax 
should be used solely and exclusively for 
the purpose of relieving the people of the 
city from the hardship and suffering caused 
by unemployment. The local law . . . was 
assailed under the U.S. Constitution as 
violative of the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the 14th amendment. 
Id., 18 Utah 2d at 207, 418 Po2d at 229. 
This Court in Menlove then included a protracted quote from 
New York Rapid Transit Corporation v. City of New York, 3 03 
U.S. 573 (1937) (hereinafter "New York Rapid Transit). This 
Court made no specific statement with regard to the application 
of the quoted provisions of New York Rapid Transit to the facts 
in Menlove. 
But an examination of New York Rapid Transit discloses only 
one applicable basis for the Menlove Court's reliance on it, 
and that relates to the use of the tax money. In New York 
Rapid Transit, the ordinance was challenged on equal protection 
grounds. The first section of Mr. Justice Reed's opinion is 
devoted to showing that the classification of utilities for the 
purpose of applying a special tax only to utilities is 
- 28 -
unassailable on equal protection grounds because of the unique 
characteristics of utilities. The heart of this section is as 
follows: 
Since the carriers or other utilities with 
the right of eminent domain, the use of 
public property, special franchises or 
public contracts, have many points of 
distinction from other business, including 
relative freedom from competition, 
especially significant with increasing 
density of population and municipal 
expansion, these public service 
organizations have no valid ground by virtue 
of the equal protection clause to object to 
separate treatment related to such 
distinctions. 
Id., at 579. 
Then, in Section III, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the 
Rapid Transit Corporation's assertion that the city could not 
adopt a tax statute for the purpose of relieving the burdens of 
unemployment which put the entire burden of the tax on one 
particular class of business. The section quoted in Menlove is 
this section III. The Court agreed that a classification must 
have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation (Jd. , at 584) and stated that 
The 'object1 as used in the rule and cases 
referred to by the corporation is the object 
of the taxpaying provisions, i.e., the 
raising of the money. If the designation of 
the utilities as the only taxpayers under 
the legislation in question does not deny to 
them the equal protection of the laws, the 
fact that an appropriation of the funds for 
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relief is a part of the legislation is not 
significant. 
Id., at 585. 
The use of tax funds is irrelevant when the classification of 
those paying taxes is based upon a difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the revenue-raising object of the tax. 
"There need be no relation between the class of taxpayers and 
the purpose of the appropriation." Id.., at 585. 
Does the reasoning used by the Court in New York Rapid 
Transit apply to Innkeepers? New York Rapid Transit is based 
first on the premise that utilities may be specially taxed, 
even for general revenues, without violating equal protection 
principles. In Menlove, the Utah Supreme Court doesn't discuss 
whether Innkeepers are subject to special taxes for general 
revenue purposes. That is the question in this case. But 
Innkeepers are very much like every other business that 
operates in the city, and in striking contrast to public 
utilities. Hotels and motels are not granted monopolies and 
public franchises, or the right of emminent domain. There is 
nothing in Menlove to suggest that Innkeepers, like public 
utilities, may always be separately classified and taxed for 
general revenues, because of the nature of their business. 
In fact, this Court has specifically stated that utilities 
may be subject to special taxes, but only to the extent of 
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their monopoly. In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
vs. Salt Lake City, 596 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah 1979), a case 
involving a tax question, this Court stated: 
At the time this Court decided Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Ogden City, 
utility companies had no competition and 
therefore could be treated as a distinct 
class. To the limited extent that 
competition in the area of manufacture and 
sale of telephones is now permitted, 
plaintiff is not a 'distinct class1 and 
cannot be treated differently from other 
manufacturers or suppliers of equipment. 
The opinion in Menlove makes no investigation of whether 
there is a reasonable relation between the classification of 
Innkeepers and the object of raising revenues, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court did in New York Rapid Transit. In the absence 
any discussion justifying special treatment of Innkeepers or 
equating Innkeepers with public utilities, it would be a gros 
distortion of New York Rapid Transit to say it supports a tax 
on Innkeepers regardless of the use of the tax. 
In fact, portions of New York Rapid Transit which were 
quoted in Menlove continue and provided a clearly apropriate 
basis for upholding the tax in Menlove. After holding that 
"there need be no relation between the class of taxpayers and 
the purpose of the appropriation" (New York Rapid Transit at 
585), the Court goes on to state as follows: 
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In some cases, the classification of 
taxpayers may be upheld as having a fair and 
substantial relation to a constitutional 
non-fiscal object [cites], but it is not 
constitutionally necessary that the 
classification be related to the 
appropriation. Jj3. , at 587. 
A reasonable relation between the entities taxed and the use of 
funds raised is a sufficient, but not a necessary ground for 
upholding a tax against the claim of violation of the 14th 
Amendment equal protection guarantees. 
This indicates a two-step inquiry to determine whether a 
particular statute violates equal protection: First, look at 
the taxpayers singled out under the taxing statute. Is the 
inclusion of only those taxpayers in the class being taxed 
rationally related to the purpose of gathering revenue? This 
is a question of whether there is something economically unique 
about the class being taxed which is rationally related to the 
revenue-producing purpose. If there is no reason as a general 
matter to treat the class being taxed separately and uniquely, 
then the second question is, does the particular use of the 
revenues produced by the tax have some rational relation to the 
class of taxpayers being taxed? In New York Rapid Transit, the 
answer to the first question was "yes," and since utilities may 
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be subject to special taxes, there was no need to address the 
second question. 
Applying this test to Menlove, the answer to the first 
question is "no"—there is nothing unique about Innkeepers as a 
general matter (especially in the absence of any evidence) 
which would justify taxing them separately. This would require 
that the second question be asked and answered to determine 
constitutionality. And in Menlove the answer to the second 
question is "yes"—there is a rational relation between 
Innkeepers, whose businesses derive in large part from 
tourists, and the use of funds to promote tourism. Although 
Menlove does not describe its application of the language 
quoted from New York Rapid Transit, an application of that test 
shows that New York Rapid Transit supports the Menlove decision 
only if the Menlove court was justifying the transient room tax 
because of the relation of the Innkeepers being taxed to the 
use of the tax money to promote recreation and tourism. 
This analysis of Menlove is bolstered by the fact that it 
did not address any of the previous Utah cases which indicate 
that there must be some justification for singling out a 
particular business as a source for raising revenue. See 
Farmington, supra, Orem City v. Pyne, supra; Weber Basin Home 
Builders v. Roy City, supra, and discussion at pages 14-19, 
supra. These cases make strong statements in favor of equality 
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and fairness in taxation. Menlove should not be read other 
than to hold that there must be a reasonable basis for 
burdening one particular business or industry with a 
disproportionate amount of the costs of government. 
Other states1 courts, when confronted with a tax similar to 
the one at issue in Menlove, have upheld the tax because of a 
rational relation between Innkeepers and the promotion of 
tourism. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has overturned a local 
revenue tax on Innkeepers even though a prior Kentucky case had 
held a tax on Innkeepers for tourist promotion to be valid. In 
City of Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971) a 5% license tax was imposed on hotels and 
motels. The Kentucky Constitution, like the Utah Statute 
involved in this case, contains a requirement that taxes "shall 
be uniform." :ic*- / at 256. The court noted that a legislature 
may discriminate between classes in the imposition of license 
taxes, but that discrimination which does not have a reasonable 
basis is obviously arbitrary and violates the principle of 
equality and uniformity set forth in the Kentucky 
Constitution. Id.. , at 257. The court further stated as 
follows: 
Running through the foregoing cases (finding 
classification unreasonable) is the 
principle that a legislative body may not, 
without some rational basis, select a 
certain type of business enterprise and 
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impose upon it a substantially heavier tax 
than that imposed upon other businesses 
which fall within the same general 
classification. Id., at 257. (emphasis 
added) 
The Kentucky Court could find no reasonable basis which would 
justify the tax in that case, although the city contended that 
extra services might be required by hotels. In that case, the 
City imposing the tax relied on a prior case upholding a 
transient room tax upon Innkeepers, for the purpose of 
financing the activities of tourist and convention 
commissions. The court said 
The principal ground upon which we sustained 
the classification was that the limited 
purpose of the tax accorded this particular 
tax payer a special benefit from the 
utilization of the revenue realized. No 
such distinguishing feature appears here. 
Id., at 259. 
See also Dicks v. Naff, 500 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Ark. 1973). 
An examination of the Menlove case and the New York Rapid 
Transit case on which it relied shows that those cases provide 
no support for SLC's position here for the reason that the tax 
in Menlove was upheld because of the rational relation of the 
transient room tax to the use of the funds for promoting 
convention, recreation, and tourist bureaus. Menlove is also 
distinguishable because it involved a question of 
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constitutionality under the 14th Amendment only, while the 
present case also raises issues under the Utah Constitution and 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80. 
IV. THE INNKEEPER TAX IS AN ILLEGAL SALES OR INCOME TAX. 
At a level even more basic than the question of whether 
Innkeeper Tax is addressed to a legally or constitutionally 
inappropriate class, this tax also fails for the reason that it 
operates as a kind of tax that lies beyond the power of Utah 
municipalities to impose. Although SLC characterized the 
Innkeeper Tax as a "license tax", it bears no functional 
resemblance to typical municipal license taxes. Rather than 
being a fixed charge assessed against someone operating a 
business as a precondition to engaging in that particular 
business, it is measured by and assessed against particular 
transactions between the business and its customers—very 
similar in operation to a sales tax. Like an income tax, it is 
periodically assessed against the receipts or income of the 
business as distinguished from the business itself. 
In 1982, SLC had already exhausted its power to impose 
sales taxes through its imposition of other pre-existing sales 
tax levies. Further, SLC—like all other Utah 
municipalities—is not lawfully empowered to impose and collect 
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an income tax. Existing transient room taxes imposed by Salt 
Lake County pursuant to its express authority under Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-31-2 (1987), now codified at § 59-12-301 (Supp. 
1987).argue against any inference that the power to collect 
such a tax may be imputed to SLC in the absence of express 
legislation. 
A. Measured by its Incidents, the Innkeeper Tax is an 
Unlawful Sales Tax, Not a License Tax. 
In Utah and elsewhere, municipalities possess only the 
taxing powers that they have clearly and expressly been 
invested with by act of the state legislature. See e.g., 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Ogden City, 2 6 
Utah 2d 190, 192, 487 P.2d 849, 850 (1971); Pacific First 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce City, 27 Wash. 2d 347, 
178 P.2d 351, 354 (1947). To meet the challenge that a 
municipal tax ordinance is beyond the city's delegated powers, 
the city must demonstrate that state law expressly authorizes 
such taxes without ambiguity: 
[0]nly a legislative act plainly and 
unmistakably delegating the specific power 
of taxation claimed will be recognized as 
conferring the power upon a local government 
entity . . . [A]11 doubts and ambiguities 
will be resolved against the existence of 
the power. 
2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 21.01 (1982). When 
previously called upon to determine the extent of a city's 
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power to collect a specific municipal tax, this Court has given 
repeated expression to the principle that "statutes imposing 
taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be 
construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the 
taxing authority." Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 
22 Utah 2d 172, 175, 450 P.2d 97, 99 (1969); W.F. Jensen Candy 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 365, 61 P.2d 629, 
632 (1936). In somewhat different context, the United States 
Supreme Court has similarly found it to be "elementary" that 
taxing measures "are to be interpreted liberally in favor of 
taxpayers and that words defining things to be taxed may not be 
extended beyond their clear import. Doubts must be resolved 
against the Government and in favor of taxpayers." Miller v. 
Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508 (1931)(citations 
omitted)(contruing federal law). 
The Utah Legislature has delegated to municipalities the 
power to "raise revenue by levying and collecting a license fee 
or tax on any business within the limits of the city." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-80 (1986). Yet a tax cannot be instantly 
legitimized regardless of its form by the simple device of 
labelling it a "license tax". As Justice Brandeis has 
explained for the Court in Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & 
Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 292 (1920), "the name by which the 
tax is described in the statute is, of course, immaterial." 
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Remembering that "statutes granting authority to 
municipalities to impose an occupation or privilege tax must be 
strictly construed," Coos Bay v. Aerie No. 58, Fraternal Order 
of Eagles, 179 Or. 83, 170 P.2d 389, 399 (1946), courts instead 
must independently determine the true nature of a tax from its 
incidents. See e.g., P. Lorillard Co. v. Seattle, 83 Wash. 2d 
586, 521 P.2d 208, 210 (1974); Eugene Theatre Co. v. Eugene, 
194 Or. 603, 243 P.2d 1060, 1074 (1952); Ingels v. Ley, 5 Cal. 
2d 154, 53 P.2d 939, 942 (1936); Independent School Dist., 
Cassia County v. Pfost, 51 Idaho 240, 4 P.2d 893, 895 (1931). 
In determining whether a municipal tax is an authorized tax, 
rules of statutory construction dictate that, "where there is 
doubt as to whether a tax comes within such statutory 
designation, the doubt is to be resolved against the tax." 
Shulick-Taylor Co. v. Wheeling, 43 S.E.2d 54, 56 (W. Va. 
1947). See Eugene Theatre Co. v. City of Eugene, 243 P.2d at 
1072. 
The tests to be employed to determine the true nature of a 
tax, as opposed to its characterization, have been variously 
described. The court in P. Lorrillard Co. v. Seattle, 83 Wash. 
586, 521 P.2d 208 (1974), summarized the tests employed by 
courts in this manner: 
It has been said that the incidence of a tax 
embraces the subject matter and the measure 
that is the base or yardstick by which the 
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tax is applied. Other cases suggest that 
the guideline is the "true operation and 
effect of the law . . . on the basis of the 
practical results which follow its 
operation," or its "incidents, and . . . the 
natural and legal effect of the language 
employed in the statute," 
Id., 521 P.2d at 210 (citations omitted). Employing these 
standards in this case it is manifest that the so-called 
license tax imposed by SLC is in its legal effect, in its 
incident, and in reality, a sales tax promulgated and imposed 
in excess of the city's statutory authority. It is a license 
tax in name only. 
Municipalities impose a license tax only if that tax 
possesses those attributes commonly associated with license or 
occupation taxes: "A license tax strictly speaking is a tax 
that must be paid by the party or dealer as a condition 
precedent to legally engaging in business and is usually 
incident to regulation under the police powers of the state." 
New Orleans v. Christian, 87 So.2d 6, 7 (La. 1956); Eugene 
Theatre Co. v. Eugene, 243 P.2d at 1074; Independent School 
Dist., Cassia County v. Pfost, 4 P.2d at 896; Cache County v. 
Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 218, 61 P. 303, 305 (1900) ("A mere tax 
imposed upon a business or occupation . . . is not a license, 
unless the levy confers a right or privilege as to the business 
which would not otherwise exist"). Similarly, an occupation 
tax is a tax on "the owners of businesses for the privilege of 
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conducting various classes of business within the boundaries of 
the city.H Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc./ 548 P.2d 1276, 
1277 (Colo. 1976). 
A license or occupation tax is further characterized by the 
fact that: 
This tax is generally measured by a flat 
rate or by such bases as capital stock, 
capital surplus, number of units or 
capacity. Usually excluded are taxes 
measured directly by transactions, gross or 
net income, or value or property except to 
those to which only nominal rates apply. 
Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 260 (Ky. 
App. 1971)(Osborne, J., concurring). M[W]here a tax has all of 
the attributes of either a sales tax or an income tax and no 
real earmarks of the ancient license tax, it cannot be 
reasonably called a license tax. To do so only confuses the 
law and confounds those who must operate under it." Id. at 264. 
The Innkeeper Tax possesses none of the attributes of a 
license tax. Hotel operators have long been subject to 
licensing requirements under section 15-13-1 of Salt Lake 
City's Ordinances. The so-called license tax imposed by the 
Innkeeper Tax ordinance neither replaces those prior license 
requirements, nor confers any new privilege on licensees. 
Further, this license tax does not operate as a condition 
precedent to engaging in the operation of a hotel or motel. 
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Instead, it levies a quarterly fee, assessed after the fact, 
against particular transactions between the businesses and 
their customers. 
Perhaps the most striking attribute of the Innkeeper Tax 
which marks it as a sales tax rather than a license tax is the 
fact that the tax is levied not as a fixed fee but as a 
percentage of certain gross receipts of hotels and motels in 
the same fashion as a sales tax. Courts in a number of 
jurisdictions have held so-called license taxes, similar to the 
present tax in their legal effect and incidents, to be sales 
taxes. In Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., Inc., 143 S.E.2d 416 
(Ga. App. 1965), the court held that a "license tax" of 2<fc on 
each pack of cigarettes sold was in actuality a sales tax. The 
Court noted: 
It is thus clear that the tax imposed by 
this ordinance is not a fixed license or 
occupation tax imposed upon one for the 
privilege of engaging in a business or 
occupation but is a sales and use tax 
imposed pon the individual transactions of 
selling, storing, or delivering cigarettes. 
Id. at 418. See also Birdsong Motors, Inc. v. Tampa, 235 So.2d 
318, 319 (Fla. App. 1970) (a license tax based on gross sales 
imposed on retail merchants was in fact a sales tax); Suzy's 
Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Kansas City, 580 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1979) (a 
license tax of 1% of the gross receipts of cafes was in fact a 
sales tax). 
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The Supreme Court of Alaska recently held a so-called 
license tax imposed upon hotel and motel rentals assessed as a 
percentage of the gross receipts of those businesses to be in 
fact a sales tax. City of Homer v. Gangl, 650 P.2d 396 
(Alaska, 1982), The tax imposed by the city in Gangl was very 
similar to the Innkeeper Tax. In concluding that the hotel tax 
levied by the City of Homer was in fact a sales tax, the Alaska 
Supreme Court noted that: 
One of the hallmarks of a sales tax is that 
it taxes the actual transaction involved; 
i.e., it is not until the sale, rental, or 
provision of services takes place that the 
tax is imposed. This distinguishes a sales 
tax from a license or privilege tax, which 
is a sum exacted for the privilege of 
carrying on an occupation in general, rather 
than any particular exercise of this 
privilege. 
Id. at 7 (citing 2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law 
§ 21.80). 
The tax at issue in the present case does not replace prior 
licenses and taxes imposed on hotels and motels in Salt Lake 
City. SLC continues to require that hotels be licensed 
pursuant to section 15-13-1 of its Ordinances. This new 
ordinance provides only that fees paid under license tax 
ordinances shall be credited against fees due under this 
ordinance. SLC thus attempts to impose dual licensing 
requirements on plaintiffs. In the context of non-profit 
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social clubs, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Utah 
statutes allow a city to license and regulate business 
enterprises, "but it may do so only once." Salt Lake City v. 
Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 421, 424 P.2d 442, 
445 (1967). 
It is plainly apparent that the Innkeeper Tax is a license 
tax in name only. Just as with a sales tax, it is imposed 
against certain transactions and gross receipts of businesses 
and, rather than being a flat fee as is common for license 
taxes, it varies depending on the revenues generated by those 
businesses. It does not supercede prior licensing ordinances 
of SLC because in reality the tax imposed by the ordinance is a 
sales tax. 
Utah law allows cities to impose a sales tax of as much as 
1%. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204 (Supp. 1987). Salt Lake City 
currently imposes that maximum allowable sales tax. As to 
plaintiffs, then, Salt Lake City by adopting this so-called 
license tax has in effect unlawfully more than doubled the 
municipal sales tax burden imposed on plaintiffs. By thinly 
disguising what is really a sales tax through the device of 
calling the imposition a license tax, Salt Lake City has 
attempted to evade the limitation on municipal sales taxes 
established by the Utah Legislature. 
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B. The Ordinance Creates an Impermissible Income Tax 
Like an income tax, the Innkeepers Tax is imposed directly 
on the revenues of the business rather than on the operator of 
the business, as would be expected of a license tax. See 
Eugene Theatre Co. v. Eugene, 243 P.2d at 1071. Like an income 
tax, the revenue produced by the Salt Lake City tax fluctuates 
with the income of the taxpayer. The fact that this tax may be 
assessed only against some of the sources of income of the 
businesses taxed is irrelevant for the purposes of 
characterizing the tax as an income tax. While Davis v. Ogden 
City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616 (1950), comments that "la]n 
occupation tax does not become an income tax because the amount 
levied is based upon gross income," (215 P.2d at 624), that 
case involved an ordinance requiring that "any person who 
engages in business" in Ogden "must obtain a 'Business 
License,*" the fee for which was graduated according to gross 
receipts of the business—i.e., a bona fide business license 
ordinance. The SLC Innkeepr Tax ordinance requires no license, 
it simply assesses a tax computed upon the income of a 
particular class of business—a discrimination considered 
unnacceptable by the Davis court. Id., 117 Utah at 326-27, 215 
P.2d at 621-22. 
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More recent cases from courts considering the question have 
abandoned such artificial distinctions. The Colorado Supreme 
Court has noted, in finding a so-called license tax to be in 
reality an income tax, "that gross income and net income taxes 
are both 'income taxes' and that 'their difference is a matter 
of degree.'" Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc., 548 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Colo. 1976). 
In concluding that a 2% fee levied against the gross 
revenues of construction and building materials businesses was 
an income tax, the court in Minturn reasoned: 
The clear inference is that an income tax, 
whether net or gross, bears a direct 
relation to the income or receipts of a 
business. An occupation tax bears no such 
relationship. The latter is a tax upon the 
very privilege of doing business, and does 
not fluctuate from month to month depending 
upon the financial success or sales of the 
enterprise. 
Id. at 1278. This conclusion was subsequently reaffirmed by 
the Colorado court in Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
v. Colorado Springs, 572 P.2d 834, 835 (Colo. 1977), which held 
that a municipal tax of 3% of utilities' gross revenues "not a 
tax on the privilege of doing business, but rather is an income 
tax." To maintain that this tax is a license tax which SLC is 
authorized to impose exalts form over substance by ignoring the 
actual effect of the tax. 
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C. Specific Legislative Treatment of Transient Room Tax 
Issues Defeats Any Inference of Municipal Power to Tax. 
Any inference that SLC has been granted the power to impose 
the Innkeeper Tax by the general language of statutes such as 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 is dispelled uipon further 
consideration of other Utah statutes specifically addressing 
the transient room tax issue. Where the Utah Legislature has 
perceived a purpose that may properly be served by imposition 
of a local transient room tax upon Innkeepers, it has expressly 
granted the power to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-301 (Supp. 
1987) unequivocally grants to county commisioners the power to 
"raise revenue by the imposition of a transient room tax." 
This tax may not exceed 
3% of the rent for every occupancy of a 
suite, room, or rooms on all persons, 
companies, corporations, or other like and 
similar persons, groups, or organizations 
doing business as motor courts, motels, 
hotels, inns, or like and similar public 
accommodations. 
Plainly, this statute authorizes a tax like the Innkeeper Tax, 
but does so only as to county governments. The statute further 
limits expenditure of revenues thus raised to specific 
visitor-related projects. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-31-1 through 
-6 (1987)(Addendum, Exhibit 7). 
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In field where the Legislature has made a deliberate, 
carefully drawn delegation of power, SLC now asserts a much 
broader authority, one wholly implied from the language oif 
general licensing statutes. Logically, the inference to be 
drawn runs in the opposite direction: where the legislature has 
so carefully designated how and by whom a transient room tax 
may be imposed, the omission of others from that grant should 
be understood as an exclusion. See 2A Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction § 47.23 (4th ed. Sands 1973). A classix maxim of 
statutory construction reads in substance: "That which is 
expressed puts an end to that which is implied." See Id. at 
123 n.l; cf. Munro v. City of Albuquerque, 48 N.M. 306, 150 
P.2d 733, 743 (1943)("Expressum facit cessare taciturn"). 
The argument of authority by implication also runs afoul of 
the Legislature's treatment of transient room taxation issues 
with reference to cities. Rather than authorizing a tax like 
that imposed by counties, the Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax 
Act provides: 
[A] city or town in which the transient room 
capacity equals or exceeds the permanent 
census population may impose a sales tax of 
up to 1%. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(8)(a)(Supp. 1987)(emphasis added). 
Thus, where concern has arisen regarding an influx of visitors 
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as guests of Innkeepers within a city, the act establishes a 
specific revenue-raising mechanism for enhancing the city's 
general fund. This grant of authority gives not even a hint of 
legislative intent that cities and towns may now impose a 
transient room tax like that used by counties, but without the 
accompanying limits on use. 
Remembering that "[c]ities are creatures of the legislature 
and can exercise no power except that granted," Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ogden City, 26 Utah 2d 190, 192, 487 P.2d 
849, 850 (1971), a power to impose the Innkeeper Tax cannot now 
be conferred upon SLC by mere inference. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court's award of summary judgment to SLC 
was in error, and because the trial court's protective order 
prohibiting discovery of taxes paid by Innkeepers to Salt Lake 
City was an abuse of discretion, appellant Hotels respectfully 
request that the summary judgment granted by the trial court on 
the issues of the legality of the classification of Innkeepers 
as the only class subject to the Innkeeper Tax be vacated and 
this case remanded to the trial court for a trial on these 
issues. Further, because it was an abuse of discretion to 
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prohibit discovery of the taxes paid by Innkeepers to SLC, 
appellant Hotels request that the trial court's protective 
order prohibiting discovery of such information be vacated and 
that the trial court be instructed upon remand to allow 
discovery of relevant facutal information. 
Should this Court determine the Innkeeper Tax to be an 
unlawful sales or income tax, the district court's judgment 
should be reversed, and judgment should be entered in favor of 
the Hotels. 
DATED December 22-
 1 9 87. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Lon Rodney Kump 
David J. Bird 
By: 
Attorneys for Little America 
Hotel Corporation 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Dorothy C. Pleshe 
Russell C. Kearl 
By: 
^^^UL-^-^o^2-
Attorneys for Utah Hotel 
Company 
CDN0712K 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION AND UTAH HOTEL COMPANY were mailed, postage fully 
prepaid, this day of December, 1987, to the following: 
Roger F. Cutler, Esq, 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
324 South State Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CDN0712K 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
No. 40 of 1982 
"(Innkeeper License Taxes) 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 3 OF TITLE 20 OF THE REVISED 
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1965, BY ADDING A NEW SECTION 
15 RELATING TO INNKEEPER LICENSE TAX. 
Be it ordained by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah: 
SECTION 1. That Chapter 3 of Title 20 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, be, and the same hereby is 
amended by ADDING a new Section 15 thereto to read as follows: 
Sec. 20-3-15. Innkeeper license tax. 
(1) There is hereby levied upon the business of every 
person, company, corporation, or other like and similar persons, 
groups or organizations, doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns or like and similar public 
accommodations, an annual license tax equal to one percent (1%) 
of the gross revenue derived from the rent for each and every 
occupancy of a suite, room or rooms, for a period of less than 
thirty (30) days. 
(2) For purposes of this section, gross receipts shall be 
computed upon the base room rental rate. There shall be excluded 
from the gross revenue, by which this tax is measured: 
(a) The amount of any sales or use tax imposed by the 
State of Utah or by any other governmental agency upon a 
retailer or consumer; 
onooo 
(b) The amount of any transcient room tax levied under 
authority of Chapter 31 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended; 
(c) Receipts from the sale or service charge for any 
food, beverage or room service charges in conjunction with 
the occupancy of the suite, room or rooms, not included In 
the base room rate; and 
(d) Charges made for supplying telephone service, gas 
or electrical energy service, not included in the base room 
rate. 
(3) Any person or business entity subject to the payment of 
taxes provided under subsection (1) of this section, shall be 
entitled to credit against the amount of taxes due thereunder, 
the amount of license taxes due the City under Sections 20-3-2 
and 20-15-3 of these ordinances. 
(4) The tax imposed by this section shall be due and pay-
able to the City Treasurer quarterly on or before the thirtieth 
day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period, 
the first of such quarterly periods being the period commencing 
with the first day of July, 1982. Every person or business taxed 
hereunder shall on or before the thirtieth day of the month next 
succeeding each calendar quarterly period, file with the License 
Division a report of its gross revenue for the preceding 
quarterly period. The report shall be accompanied by a remit-
tance of the amount of tax due for the period covered by the 
-2- r^nrmCMT. 
report. 
The City may contract with the state tax commission to 
perform all functions incident to the administration and opera-
tion of this ordinance. 
SECTION 2. This ordinance shall become effective July 1, 
1982. No tax shall be due or accrue under-this enactment prior 
to such effective date. 
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
this 8th day of J""e , 1982. 
^ ( w m ^ ^ 
CHAIRMAN 
ATTEST: 
(9W/A*rn-/?1V^-JL (7SL^ 
VCXTi RECORDER 
T r a n s m i t t e d to Mayor on June 15, 1982 
Mayor's A c t i o n :
 J u n e 1 5 > l g 8 2 
MAYOR 
ATTEST: 
*?W/U£i)UMJLu 
CI$f RECORDER 
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F!LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utsh 
NOV 3 01933 
H ~/rr, . ..J-...jCia5rSf#5lst. Court 
^^^ • —~~ yDeputy C:erK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SHERD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-82-5220 
This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment between the various plaintiffs and the defendants 
Also before the Court are cross Motions to Strike all or portions 
of affidavits filed by the respective parties in support of or 
in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment. This matter 
was extensively briefed and argued by the parties1 respective 
counsel. Following argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement and has now considered further the oral arguments 
made by counsel for the respective parties, the exhaustive 
Memoranda submitted by all parties, reviewed the cases cited by 
the parties, and has conducted further independent research on 
the questions and issues raised. 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL 
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court is now fully advised on the issues, and therefore 
enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
The Court declines to deal individually or in depth with 
the multitude of legal issues raised by the various parties, 
inasmuch as the legal Memoranda of the respective parties 
accomplish that task in an extremely adequate fashion, and to 
restate those legal arguments here would only tend to unduly 
lengthen this Memorandum Decision. 
With regard to some of the issues raised by the parties, 
the Court is satisfied that the application of proper law and 
proper legal analysis allows this Court to make disposition 
of those issues as a matter of law. Other issues, however, 
necessarily encompass disputed material issues of fact that 
under the rules applicable to motions for summary judgment, 
prohibit determination as a matter of law, and require full 
resolution of those contested issues of fact by a trier of fact. 
The Court is of the opinion that the affidavits to which 
objections have been raised, should be allowed, for purposes 
of these Motions, at least for determination as to the weight 
to be given to the statements offered by the various affiants. 
The Court is mindful of the potential foundational difficulties 
that exist in some or all of the affidavits, and has considered 
those potential foundational problems in determining the weight 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL 
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to be given to the respective affidavits. The cross Motions 
to Strike affidavits (referred to by the defendant as "Objections") 
are denied. The Court has considered the affidavits in light of 
the above standards and even giving the appropriate weight to 
the affidavits, the affidavits lead this Court to the inescapable 
conclusion that a portion of the issues raised in the respective 
Motions for Summary Judgment contain material questions of fact 
prohibiting disposition of this case as a matter of law. 
The Court concludes, based upon the undisputed facts or 
upon those facts where no "substantial" disputed facts exist, 
and upon application of the legal authorities urged by the 
defendants, which the Court accepts as proper and appropriate 
under the circumstances of this case, that Summary Judgment in 
part as suggested above, is appropriate. The Court finds in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on all legal 
issues raised by the pleadings and Motions, together with those 
suggested in the supporting Memoranda, with the exception of the 
issue of "classification" and whether or not such a classification 
is arbitrary and/or discriminatory. A determination of the issue 
of the reasonableness of the classification under the circum-
stances of this case must be based on the facts as they may 
eventually be found by a trier of fact. The affidavits, 
considered in the light set out above, make clear that contested 
issues of fact remain for ultimate resolution at trial on the 
classification issue. 
00031S 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL 
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The legal authorities and positions urged by the plaintiffs 
regarding the validity of the defendant Salt Lake City's ordinance 
other than the "classification" issue are not, in the Court's 
judgment well taken or are otherwise not applicable in this case. 
While the plaintiffs attempt to raise fact questions in 
some limited areas in their Reply Memorandum, for example: 
interference with interstate commerce, there exists no "genuine 
issue of material fact" so as to prohibit Summary Judgment on 
those issues. 
Accordingly, the Motions of the respective plaintiffs for 
Summary Judgment are denied. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
of the defendants is granted in part and denied in part in 
conformance with this Memorandum Decision. 
Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare an Order 
reflecting the foregoing, and submit the same, to the Court for 
review and signature pursuant to Rule 2.9/$£ the Rules of 
Practice for the District Courts of the/State of Utah. 
Dated this ^& day of No^^beV\ 198/. 
r m n Q i p 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this QO day of November, 1983: 
Lon Rodney Kump 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent M. Winterholler 
James M. Elegante 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Pearson 
Enterprises, Boyer-Gardner Hotel 
Properties, Tri-Arc Hotel Associates, 
and Holiday Inns, Inc. 
185 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Dorothy C. Pleshe 
Attorney for Plaintiff Utah 
Hotel Company 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Roger F. Cutler 
Attorney for Defendants 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Lon Rodney Kump 
State Bar Number 1862 
David J. Bird 
State Bar Number 0334 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-8987 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v.. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al., 
Defendants, 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
Civil No. C82-5220 
JUDGE HANSON 
THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO: UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
WE COMMAND YOU, that all singular business and excused 
being laid aside you appear on August 15, 1985 at 10:00 a.m.* 
at the offices of Richards, Bird & Kump, 333 East Fourth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and that at that time you produ 
and allow for inspection by plaintiff, an accurate summary 
your records of the total Utility Franchise Taxes paid by t. 
businesses identified on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporate 
herein by reference. Please provide only the total utility franchise 
taxes paid for the entire group of hotels or motels identifiec 
on Exhibit "A" for each of the two fiscal years, July 1, 1981 
001090 
2 
to June 30, 1983 (Fiscal 1983), and July 1, 1983 to June 30, 
1984 (Fiscal 1984). Please provide no data specific to any one 
customer. At the time and place described above, you will be 
deposed before a certified shorthand reporter concerning the 
records you are required to produce. Rather than attend the 
deposition and bring the records, you may, prior to the date 
set for your deposition, produce the records requested and provide 
plaintiff or its authorized representative adequately verified 
copies of such records. To do so, please make arrangements with 
plaintiff's attorney. Please be advised that plaintiff agrees 
to pay you the reasonable cost of production of these documents. 
Please make prior arrangements regarding calculation of such 
charges with plaintiff's attorney. 
Disobedience will be punished as a contempt by the 
above-named Court. 
WITNESS: THE HONORABLE JUDGES of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, this J_j day of July in the year of our Lord One Thousand 
Nine Hundred and Eighty-Five. 
ATTEST, my hand and the seal of said Court the day 
and year last above written. 
ri. WXON BINDLEY 
Clerk J ~ J 
By K^4-LJI J2JAC±&QJSLA 
Deputy Q e r k J 
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H. Dixoa Hindiey, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy Clerk 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-82-5220 
The matter pending before the Court in the above-referenced 
proceeding is the defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion 
for a Protective Order, wherein the City seeks to relieve a 
third party, Utah Power and Light, from the obligation to respond 
to a Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated July 11, 1985, issued and served 
at the request of the plaintiff. The matter of the type of 
discovery sought by the proposed inquiry directed at Utah Power 
and Light has been before the Court on at least two prior occasions. 
On those prior occasions the Court has refused to allow the 
inquiry, and has granted the protective relief sought, or on 
the last occasion, has refused to reconsider a prior Order. 
At the latest hearing, all interested parties appeared and argued 
their respective positions. It was clear to the Court that 
the Court's prior rulings regarding the defendant City's Motions 
for Summary Judgment are not clear as to what issues remain 
for determination in this suit. Accordingly, the Court directed 
nO 
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counsel to set forth their positions as to the breadth of the 
Court's prior rulings on the City's Motions for Summary Judgment 
regarding the remaining issues, in letter form. The parties 
have done that, and the Court has reviewed those materials. 
The Court was hopeful that the capsulized versions in the afore-
mentioned letter briefs would allow the Court to re-evaluate 
the issues and resolve the questions regarding the remaining 
issues for trial determination without the necessity of reviewing 
all the prior Memoranda in the prior extensive files that led 
up to this Court's Order dealing with the plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment which were denied, and the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted in part and denied 
in part. Unfortunately, such was not the case, and to adequately 
advise itself regarding the reasons and basis, and more particularly 
the scope and breadth of the Court's rulings regarding remaining 
issues the Court has again reviewed the materials submitted 
in this case by all parties. Having accomplished that task, 
and having taken into account the arguments of the parties, 
the Court makes the following Memorandum Decision. 
As to the position of the parties as to the scope and breadth 
of the Court's ruling on the defendant City's Motions for Summary 
Judgment, the position asserted by Salt Lake City is correct. 
Whether or not the benefits received by the plaintiff from the 
defendant bears any relationship to the taxes paid is not an 
LITTLE AMERICA V. CITY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
issue that remains for determination. The Court's prior rulings 
on the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment encompassed such 
a claim, and by this Memorandum any ambiguity contained in either 
the Memorandum Decision or the subsequent Order signed by the 
Court is resolved. The only remaining issue is whether or not 
the tax classification in question is arbitrary and/or discriminatory 
as applied. 
Based upon the foregoing clarification of the Court's prior 
Orders, the information sought from non-party Utah Power and 
Light to which the defendant City objects and seeks a protective 
order is not material nor relevant to the remaining issues, 
and therefore the protective order sought by the City should 
be granted. 
Counsel for the City is requested to prepare an appropriate 
Order which encompasses not only this^Court's ruling on the 
requested protective order, but specifically identifies in accordance 
with the foregoing discussions the is^ rue remaining for determination. 
Dated this / 3 day of 
?IMOTHYxR. HANSON 
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HMMJ5Y 
a?rt _ 
fiy f ^ T ^ ^ 
£>apur, Oi&f% 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this_ .day of February, 1986: 
Lon Rodney Kump 
David J. Bird 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger F. Cutler 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
100 City & County Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John Fellows 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Kent M. Winterholler 
185 S. State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul H. Proctor 
Attorneys for Utah Power and Light 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340 
P. O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Lon Rodney Kump 
David J. Bird 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Little America Hotel Corporation 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-8987 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
MAR 22 4 si PHf83 
'H. DIXON HINDLEY CLERK 
t y'ln OIST. COURT?; 
' ^ OcFUTYCLEfiiT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERRILL R. NORMAN 
Civil No. C 82-5220 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake) 
Comes now Merrill R. Norman, who having been first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and saith as follows: 
1. Fox & Company is a national partnership of certified public account-
ants, with its Utah office located at 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The affiant is a partner of said company and himself a duly licensed 
certified public accountant in the state of Utah. 
ftO1 o *^-
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2. Affiant has received advance education degrees including a Bachelor 
of Science in Accounting, Masters of Business Administration and additional 
post graduate work in finance and economics. Affiant is currently the 
partner-in-charge of the Business Advisory Services in the Salt Lake City 
office which provides consulting services of various types for clients in 
seven western states. Affiant's experience includes financial, industrial and 
governmental audits, feasibility studies, utility rate regulation, investiga-
tive accounting, and general business consulting. Affiant has qualified as an 
expert and testified before federal and state courts, Public Service Commis-
sions in various states, Securities and Exchange Commission, Internal Revenue 
Service, and a Special Presidential Commission on Funding of the Central Utah 
Project. Affiant has performed engagements relative to the measurement of the 
impact of tax limitation upon cities and towns within the state of Utah, and 
other municipal consulting type engagements. Affiant has provided consulting 
services of various types to the hotel industry including the Little America 
Hotel group, the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel, Cottontree Inn, etc. 
3. Prior to June 1, 1982, affiant was contacted, hired and retained by 
Little America Hotel Corporation (LAHCO) to be an expert witness in the above-
captioned litigation. Among other purposes, he was retained for the purpose 
of evaluating the discriminatory nature and economic impact of the proposed 
innkeeper license tax to be levied upon hotels, motels, inns and like or 
similar accommodations within Salt Late City (SLC). Affiant has undertaken to 
use his expert knowledge and accounting background to evaluate those issues. 
o , o o ^ 
Affiant's services and those of his firm were retained in anticipation of 
litigation and preparation for trial and pretrial motions. Affiant has access 
to all accounting and tax records of LAHCO, and has utilized such records in 
the development of his opinions relating to this matter. 
4. Affiant has reviewed the affidavit of Louis E. Miller, Acting 
Director of the SLC International Airport (airport authority), filed by 
defendants in this case, and the financial reports of SLC Corporation, which 
contain financial information as to the operations of the airport authority, 
for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981. 
5. Based on his review of the financial information and as an expert, 
affiant states that the airport authority is operated as an enterprise fund of 
SLC. As an enterprise fund, the airport is a self-supporting activity within 
the SLC government which renders service on a user-charge basis. The airport 
authority derives its revenues from sales and charges for various services 
provided at the airport. Operating costs, including general obligation bonds 
(both interest and principal), are paid for by these revenues. Historically, 
revenues have consistently exceeded costs, resulting in net income of 
$3,211,737 in 1979, $3,835,256 in 1980, and $3,078,798 in 1981. 
6. In addition to income generated from its principal activities, the 
airport authority contracts with concessionaires whose business activities 
generate sales tax for the general fund of SLC. As a self-supporting 
activity, the airport authority provides a necessary link between SLC and the 
outside world. 
nO» f t V 
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7. Hotel and motel owners are not the sole beneficiaries of ancillary 
revenues originating from travelers and employees associated with the SLC 
International Airport. A substantial portion of local enterprise, particu-
larly those businesses that cater to out-of-town travelers and interstate 
commerce, derives direct benefit. Likewise, local residents leaving SLC via 
the airport also benefit. The governmental sector also benefits, since the 
airport provides transportation means for tourists and other types of incoming 
travelers who generate additional tax revenues. 
8. The use of a special tax on hotels and motels to attempt recovery of 
costs of the airport (if they were not entirely recovered from airport author-
ity revenues) would discriminate against hotel and motel guests arriving in 
SLC by use of other forms of transportation (i.e., car, bus, train). 
9. Defendant claims that SLC Corporation expends funds on behalf of the 
airport for which it is not reimbursed. Affiant is not aware of any reason 
why the city cannot levy fees on the airport to obtain reimbursement. 
10. If there are some unreimbursed airport-related expenditures on the 
part of the SLC general fund, then residents and hotel/motel guests share the 
unreimbursed costs through existing general fund taxes i.e., sales and pro-
perty. To levy taxes on hotel/motel guests only for these unreimbursed costs 
places a discriminatory burden on them. 
11. Affiant has reviewed the affidavit of E.L. "Bud" Willoughby who 
claims that the "highly transient nature of SLC hotel and motel guests renders 
hotels and motels susceptible to a high degree of criminal activity11 and that 
"the high degree of transiency occurring by hotel residents often makes more 
difficult the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases occurring within 
hotels." 
-5-
12. Affiant is of the opinion that guests of the LAHCO and many other 
hotels receive proportionately fewer benefits from the SLC Police Department 
(SLPD) than do residents or nonhotel visitors to SLC. This is attributed to 
the fact that LAHCO, as well as many other hotels, provides an extensive 
security force on the premises for the protection of their guests. Affiant 
has quantified the benefits LAHCO guests derive from the SLPD by two different 
methods: 
a. First, the yearly utilization of the SLPD by LAHCO has been 
measured by comparing total police calls to LAHCO to total police calls 
made by the SLPD (Method I, see Exhibit 1). The results show that LAHCO 
accounts for .001670 of all calls for 1981. 
b. Second, the average acreage of the LAHCO is compared to all SLC 
acreage. The ratio is then multiplied by a factor to reflect the 
increased police protection needed in the downtown area (Method II, see 
Exhibit 1). LAHCO accounts for .001656 of all calls in SLC. 
c. The average of these two measurements of SLPD utilization by 
LAHCO is .001663 (See Exhibit 1). 
13. Total police department expenditures for 1979, 1980 and 1981 total 
$44,479,418 (see Exhibit 3). Applying the average percentage of SLPD utiliza-
tion by LAHCO, determined by the two methods, to the SLPD expenditures esti-
mates LAHCO1s cost of police services, which amounts to $73,969 (see Exhibit 
2). The same exhibit compares this cost to what was actually paid by LAHCO 
for the same period. Total taxes paid to SLC general fund by LAHCO for the 
same period total $808,980 (see Exhibit 4). Police department expenditures as 
a percent of total general fund expenditures for the same period 
-6-
(see Exhibit 3) equal 26.54%. Assuming a proportionate distribution of taxes 
paid by LAHCO, raxes paid for tin- nitration of the SLPD Im I'-'M through 1981 
would be $214,703. Comparing this to the total police expenditures for LAHCO 
based on ut itilization ^ • r-f-u police calls reveals that for the years 1979 
t-*.' .*.. 4-h, .- • • ice services of $JAOv734. 
14. In addition to paying more than, their proportionate share of police 
department expenditures, guests at LAHCO pay approximately $100,000 per year 
for its own security force on the premises. 
15. Affiant has compared the oer capita SLPD call rare ro that of LAHCO. 
Exhibi t 5 demonstrates that Hi: re . .- > - • . n* * - * . - guests is 39% 
of the overall rate for SLC. 
16. LAHCO guests contribute more than their fair share of the financial 
burden for prov iding set vi ces of the SLPD. • • . 
17. Affiant has reviewed the affidavit of Peter 0. Pederson, affiant for 
SLC, who claims that "the unique nature of hotels and motels render tk lem si is-
ceptible to high fire risk and impose unusual costs and risks upon the City 
and its personnel." 
IB, Taxes ioi tire dt-pfn I men I services a i f paid I ir Mu- availability of 
such services and the usage of such services. In the first instance, standard 
fire-fighting equipment would service all nonhigh-rise structures and would be 
paid for through the exi sting tax system. High-rises, on the other hand, 
require additional training and equipment to be maintained by the fire depart-
ment. It is erroneous to think that hotels and
 motels are unique in requiring 
^ $ & 
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such support. The fire department classifies a high-rise as being taller than 
75 feet (the height of their tallest ladder). Exhibit 6 identifies the build-
ings in SLC over five stories in height. All hotels account for 11.5% of the 
high rise floor space in SLC. The tallest buildings in SLC are commercial 
buildings, apartment buildings, condominiums, and other buildings that do not 
provide SLC with either sales tax revenue or the innkeeper tax revenue for 
rental or ownership of space. Specialized fire department service to provide 
protection to high-rises is not unique to the hotel/motel industry (which 
already pays sales tax on hotel rentals while the other building are sales-tax 
free as to rental or ownership costs). An additional innkeeper tax to recover 
costs of the fire department is certainly discriminatory. 
19. The fire department also provides paramedic service. Such service is 
ideally suited for user fees. Ambulance fees, for example, are charged 
directly to users. Ambulance companies often provide both ambulance and para-
medic services. By currently paying a disproportionate share of fire depart-
ment costs, LAHCO already shoulders more than its share of ancillary services 
such as paramedic protection for its guests and staff. The desire to generate 
additional revenues could be more fairly satisfied by alternatives that tend 
to level the tax burden among all public users. 
20. Affiant has allocated total fire department expenditures for 1979, 
1980 and 1981 over the ratio of the population of the LAHCO to the total 
population of SLC (see Exhibit 7). Based on this allocation, LAHCOfs propor-
tionate fire department expenditures would be $133,753. Taxes paid by LAHCO 
to the SLC general fund in the same three-year period were $808,980. When 
allocated to the fire department by the departments percentage expenditure to 
total general fund expenditures, taxes paid by LAHCO for support of the fire 
department totals $151,522. Accordingly, LAHCO's actual expenditures for fire 
protection exceed its consumptive share of service and result in a subsidy to 
other users in the approximate amount of $17,769. The additional innkeeper 
tax increases this existing excess burden. 
21. Affiant has made a comparison of the per capita taxes paid to SLC by 
tourists and residents (see Exhibit 9 ) . A. similar comparison was prepared by 
SLC offic i a 1 s I n c on s i d e r i ng t: he o r d i n an c e (E x h i b i t 2 J P"! a i n t i f £' ' s a i i s we i t o 
Defendent's interrogatory, # 1 ) , however, the City's comparison assumes that 
tourists do not pay property or franchise taxes. Hotels and motels contribute 
to the general fund by paying these same taxes. Hotel and motels guests pay 
these taxes in addition to all other costs of hotel service. Affiant has, 
therefore, computed for LAHCO i n Exhibi t 9 the per capi ta property taxes ai id 
franchise-business taxes paid by guests for fiscal year 1981 through room 
rates. This was done by equating 365 guest nights to one SLC resident for a 
y e a i , I n 11 i e i i p r e v i o u s s t u d y, SI C a 1 s o e r i: o n e o u s 1 y £ a i 1 s t o c o n s i d e r t: h e 
transient room tax which only hotel/motel-type businesses pay. This tax is 
used exclusively to develop the tourist industry in the Salt Lake County 
area. Such tourist development benefits SLC government, businesses and resi-
dents without requiring such parties to pay similar taxes. The inkeeper tax 
inc re a s e s t h i s i nb a 1 a nc e by p 1 a c i ng ad d i t i o na 1 t: ax b u rd en on ho t e 1 prices. 
22. Affiant is aware of changes in the assessed value of property which 
will cause nonresidential property t pay additional property tax. Title 59 -
Revenue and laxat, i, on, Chapter S • - ~tr.-»nt mf Property, Article I. „ General 
Provision, states in part:,, "all taxable property, not specifically exempted 
-9-
under Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be assessed 
at 20% of its reasonable fair cash value; but in implementing the exemption 
for residential property provided for in that Section 2, residential property 
shall be assessed at 15% of its reasonable fair cash value/1 
23. The above exemption, known as Proposition I, was voted on and passed 
by the general public on November 2, 1982. The amendment is effective 
January 1, 1983. Commercial property, which includes hotels and motels but 
not apartment structures are being taxed at higher assessed values than resi-
dential properties. Approximately 20.8% of the property taxes paid within SLC 
end up in the general fund of SLC. Under the amendment, commercial property 
owners pay a larger percentage of the 20.8% of property taxes allocated to the 
SLC general fund. Of the remaining 79.2% of property tax (that portion 
administered by Salt Lake County), public education represent the single 
largest expense. Salt Lake City residents share directly in educational 
benefits, while hotel guests do not. 
24. Affiant has computed the impact of the iiinkeeper tax on LAHCO assum-
ing the tax was in effect for LAHCO's fiscal year ended June 30, 1981 (see 
Exhibit 10). The tax would have increased the taxes paid by LAHCO to the SLC 
general Fund by 42%. The first six months the tax was in effect (July 1 
through December 31) LAHCO paid $56,668.86. The business license fee (which 
is a credit on the innkeeper tax) actually paid in 1981 was $5,107. The inn-
keeper license tax (had it been effective for all of 1981) would have totaled 
$119,737. 
ooo** 
25. Overall, the tax burden borne by hotels and motels and in particular, 
LAHCO Corporation, exceed the tax burden borne by any other class of tax-
payer. Exhibi t: ] 1 1 dent if ies the various types of taxes borne by various 
categories of residents or individuals residing or owning businesses within 
SLC boundaries. Guests at hotels and motels are subject to three additional 
taxes not levied on. others in similar circumstances. 
26. Further affiant saith naught. 
Dated this 22nd day of March, 1983. 
Merrill R. Norman 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ _ ^  day of March, 1983, 
'.as 
NOTARYKPUBLIC 
res id ing in S?H kl(t Cfty 
My commis s i on exp i  e  l re s : ^ « & ^ 
c\ nO#V-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T h i s c e r t i f i e s t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g A f f i d a v i t o f M e r r i l l 
Re Norman was s e r v e d t h i s day o f March , 19 8 3 , by h a n d - d e l i v e r i n c 
a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy h e r e o f t o Roger F . C u t l e r , S a l t Lake C i t y 
A t t o r n e y , 100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 , 
and on James M. E l e g a n t e , PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 Sou th 
S t a t e S t r e e t , P . O . Box 1189 8, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84147 , and 
on Mark Van Wagoner , GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER, 800 K e n n e c o t t 
B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 3 3 . 
m (jQof) 
Exhibit 1 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE C m , et al. 
LAHCO UTILIZATION OF POUCH DEPARTMENT 
Year ended December 31, 1981 
Method I; LAHCO police calls to total SLC police calls 
Type of call 
Part I crimes 
Part II crimes 
Accidents (31), 
(12), 
Total 
(a) 
traffic 
and service 
Method I 
(34) 
Total 
LAHCO 
55 
59 
77 
191 
number of calls 
SLC 
20, 
458 
48, 
114, 
(a) 
» 
850 
,319 
,211 
,380 
Percent of 
LAHCO 
to total 
number of calls 
.002638 
.001302 
.001597 
.001670 
Method II; Police Department utilization by acreage ratio 
Total square miles of LAHCO (10 acres)(b) .015600 
Total square miles of SLC(c) 75,400100 
Ratio of LAHCO to SLC .000207 
Factor for increased police protection needed 
in downtown area(a) 8 
Total Method 11 .001656 
Average Method I and II ,001663 
Sources: 
(a) SLC Police Department - Crime Analysis Divi sion 
(b) Based on 640 acres per square mile 
(c) SLC Fire Department - 1981 Annual Report 
Exhibit 2 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.f 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID BY LAHCO FOR POLICE 
PROTECTION TO BENEFITS RECEIVED 
YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1979 THROUGH 1981 
Total police department expenditures (Exhibit 3) 
Portion used by LAHCO based on utilization of police 
department and area covered (Exhibit 1) 
Total police department expenditures for LAHCO 
$44,479,418 
.001663 
$ 73.969 
• • • • • • • ^ • K B 
Taxes paid by LAHCO to SLC General Fund 
(Exhibit 4) 
Police department expenditure percentage (Exhibit 3) 
Taxes paid by LAHCO for the police department 
Taxes paid by LAHCO in excess of proportionate benefit 
received 
808,980 
26.54% 
1 
i 
214.703 
140.734 
QOU o ^ 
Exhibit 3 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al* 
SLC - GENERAL EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION 
Years ended June 30, 1979 through 1981 
Finance 
Office of and 
Budget and admini 
icai City Management City strative Development Public Nondepart-
>ar Council Mayor Planning attorney Personnel services Fire Police services Parks works mental Total 
) $ - $ 977,607 $ 190,412 $ 515,018 $ 504,333 $ 5,664,573 $ 8,785,195 $13,046,859 $1,295,530 $ 2,962,335 $11,315,238 $2,327,120 $ 47,584,220 
) 98,192 1,236,578 369,886 572,523 572,022 4,925,310 10,870,553 14,923,675 2,254,315 3,516,125 12,625,756 4,849,386 56,814,321 
L 314,419 1,171,965 609,478 698,301 647,862 5,362,992 11,741,582 16,508,884 4,606,548 4,442,040 14,472,150 2,617,475 63,193,696 
»e-
ir 
:al $412.611 $3.386.150 $1.169.776 $1.785.842 $1.724.217 $15.952.875 $31.397.330 $44.479.418 $8.156.393 $10.920.500 $38.413.144 $9.793.981 $167.592.237 
:en= 
e-s- ^25* 2.02^ i % 1.06% 1.03% 9.52% 18.73= 26.541 4.871 6.5-i 22.92% 5.84Z 100.001 
Nondepartmental and the total are decreased by $1,577,055 of funds transferred to special assessments and capital projects. 
* e SLC Corporate Annual Reports.) 
•A 
t $ 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
TAXES PAID BY LAHCO 
Years ended June 30, 1979 through 1981 
Classification of Taxes Paid 
Fiscal year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Transient 
room tax 
$242,210 
314,657 
359,938 
$916.805 
Utah 
income tax 
$ 18,814 
94,680 
180,300 
$293.794 
Sales and 
use taxes 
$ 782,354 
951,551 
1,043,113 
$2,777,018 
Utility 
franchise 
taxes 
$ 42,425 
45,359 
38,266 
$126.050 
Property 
taxes 
(Schedule 4) 
$ 485,642 
419,935 
378,890 
$1.284.467 
Total 
$1,571,445 
1,826,182 
2,000,507 
$5.398.134 
Distribution of Taxes Paid 
alt Lake City 
General Fund 
alt Lake City 
and County 
tate of Utah 
ther 
$ 416,553 $126,050 
293,794 2,221,614 
2_ 138,851 
$293,794 $2,777,018 $126,050 
«=Esaacd^acxss ^PsdcandngeBBB a s s a t s d a B B a 
$ 266,377 
1,018,090 
$ 808,980 
1,018,090 
2,515,408 
1,055,656 
$5.398.134 
lource: LAHCO records 
& 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
COMPARISON OF SLPD CALLS PER CAPITA 
LAHCO Total SLC 
Total number of police calls for year ended 
December 31, 1981 (see Exhibit 1) 191 114,380 
Divided by per capita population 
(see Exhibit 8) 
Per capita call rate 
j 990 
.1929 
T 232,383 
.4922 
Percent LAHCO rate is of total SLC (.1929 - .4922) 39% 
k|-\f$»" 
Exhibit 5 
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LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
BUILDINGS GREATER THAN FIVE FLOORS IN SLC 
OFFICE BUILDING: 
Church Office Building 
Beneficial Tower 
University Club 
Commercial Security Building 
Kennecott Building 
County Complex 
Mountain Bell 
Walker Bank Building 
Behavioral Science, U of U 
Continental Bank 
Deseret Building 
Utah Retirement Systems 
(Wildewood Tower) 
Boyer Company 
First Security Bank 
International Inc. 
Utah Bancorporation 
(Valley Bank) 
Boston Building 
Hall of Justice 
Newhouse Building 
Episcopal MGM 
The Tribune Builiding 
Lincoln Association 
City and County Building 
Federal Building 
Mountain Fuel 
J.C. Penny Building 
Bell Telephone 
Boyer Gardner 
Clark Learning 
Hill Mangum 
Phillips Petroleum 
Royal Tribe 
Boyer Company 
Commercial Club 
State Office Building 
Todd & Lignell 
Number 
of 
floors 
30 
27 
24 
20 
18 
16 
16 
16 
14 
14 
14 
14 
13 
12 
12 
12 
11 
11 
11 
10 
10 
9 
8 
8 
8 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Number of 
floors 
above 6 
24 
21 
18 
14 
12 
10 
10 
10 
8 
8 
8 
8 
7 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Rental 
space 
Sales 
tax 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
or ownership of 
is subject to 
Innkeepers 
tax 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Total office buildings 432 216 
(Continued) 
(Continued) 
Exhibit 6 
Page 2 of 2 
HOTELS: 
Little America 
Hotel Marriott 
Hilton Hotel 
Howard Johnson Hotel 
Tri-Arc Travel Lodge 
Hotel Utah 
Number Number ot 
of floors 
floors above 6 
16 
14 
13 
13 
13 
11 
10 
8 
7 
7 
7 
5 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Rental or ownership of 
space is subject to 
Sales Innkeepers 
tax tax 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Total Hotels 80 44 
C0ND0S: 
Canyon Crest 
Bonneville Towers 
Aztec Apartments 
Zions Summit 
Belvedere 
Bara Investment 
University Heights 
Oak Crest 
17 
15 
12 
12 
9 
8 
8 
7 
11 
9 
6 
6 
3 
2 
2 
1 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Total Condos 88 40 
APARTMENTS: 
Sunset Towers 
Friendship Manor 
Medical Housing, U of U 
Charleston Apartments 
The Stansbury 
Wasatch Towers 
Carlton Towers 
Ben Albert Apartments 
Irving Heights 
Tot a I Apartments 
Total number of floors 
15 
14 
14 
10 
10 
9 
8 
7 
_7 
94 
94 
9 
8 
8 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
40 
340 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Hotels floors as a 
percentage ot total 
floors 11.5% 12.9% 
Source: SLC Building and Housing Services originally supplied by SLC 
Fire Department. 
Note: Buildings greater than six floors have been selected because the 
tallest ladder of the fire department is approximately 75 feet 
high. 
nO°' 
rt *&&* 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID BY LAHCO FOR FIRE 
PROTECTION TO BENEFITS RECEIVED 
Years ended June 30, 1979 through 1981 
Total Fire Department expenditures (Exhibit 3) 
Portion used by LAHCO based on population ratio of 
LAHCO to SLC (Exhibit 8) 
Total Fire Department expenditure for LAHCO 
Taxes paid by LAHCO to SLC General Fund 
(Exhibit 4) 
Average Fire Department Expenditure percentage 
(Exhibit 3) 
Taxes paid by LAHCO for the Fire Department 
Taxes paid by LAHCO in excess of proportionate 
benefit received 
$31,397,330 
.00426 
133,753 
808,980 
18.73% 
151,522 
$ 17,769 
o' 00' 
Exhibit 8 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
POPULATION RATIO ANALYSIS 
LAHCO (a) 
Total number of guest nights - FYE June 30, 1982 314,214 
Divided by total number of days 365 
Average number of guests at a given time 861 
Total number of employees on payroll 540 
Times number of hours per week (40/168) .238 
Average number of employees at a given time 129 
Average population of LAHCO 990 
Salt Lake City 
Resident population of SLC(b) 163,000 
Additional daytime population of SLC 
[137,000 x 10/24 (hours in SLC)](c) 57,083 
Population of all hotel guests(d) 12,300 
Average population of SLC 232,383 
Population ratio of LAHCO to SLC 
(990 - 232,383) ,00426 
Sources: 
(a) LAHCO Records 
(b) 1980 Census 
(c) SLC Planning and Zoning Department 
(d) Office of the Mayor - Innkeeper License Tax Proposal (Exhibit 4-G 
answer to interrogatories #1) 
bxnibit y 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al.f 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID BY SLC RESIDENTS 
TO PER CAPITA TAXES PAID BY LAHCO GUESTS 
Year ended June 30, 1981 
LAHCO guests Residents 
Type of tax (per capita) (per capita)(a) 
Sales $ 75 (c) $ 46 
Property 220 (b) 58 
Franchise/business 22 (b) 26 
Transient room 
130 
735 130 
Innkeeper tax 139 (b) -
874 $130 
Note: Property and franchise/business taxes have been adjusted for the 
nonovernight room area, by assuming that only 50% of these taxes 
is attributable to the overnight room accomodations. In the 
opinion of the affiant this is a conservative estimate. 
Sources: (a) "Innkeeper License Tax, A Revenue Alternative,11 prepared 
by Albert E. Haines, Chief Administration Officer of SLC 
Corporation, May 19, 1982 (Exhibit 4-G answers to 
interrogatories #1). 
(b) LAHCO records. See Exhibit 8 for per capita hotel guests 
and employees. See Exhibit 4 for break down of taxes paid 
by LAHCO in 1981. 
(c) Same sources as (a), however, if LAHCO per capita sales 
amounts are used, the tourist sales tax would be $182. 
Exhibit 10 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
COMPARISON OF TAXES PAID TO THE SLC GENERAL FUND BY LAHCO 
Year ended June 30, 1981 
1981 taxes paid 
Type of tax 
Sales and use 
Utility franchise 
Property 
Business license 
Innkeeper license tax 
Actual 
$156,467 
38,266 
74,062 
5,107 
-
$273.902 
Assuming 
innkeeper 
tax in effect 
$156,467 
38,266 
74,062 
-
119,737 
$388.532 
Percentage increase in taxes paid to SLC 
by LAHCO in 1981 if innkeeper tax in effect 42% 
Percentage Increase in business license taxes for 
innkeepers under innkeeper license tax 
($119,737 - $5,107) 2.345% 
Source: LAHCO records. 
Note: The first six months the innkeeper tax was imposed by the City, 
LAHCO paid $56,668.86. 
Exhibit 11 
Taxes paid by 
residents of 
Condominiums 
Office 
buildings 
Apartment8 
Residents 
Hotel/motels 
Property tax (a) 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., 
V8« 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. 
Sales tax (b) 
Utility, business and 
franchise tax (c) 
Residents pay for tax 
through rent or if 
owned they pay direct. 
Occupants pay the 
property tax of the 
building through rent 
or lease payments. 
Renters pay property 
through their rent. 
Residents pay property 
tax. 
Guests pay property 
tax through room rates. 
Mo sales tax is paid 
on the rental or 
lease of office space. 
No sales tax on 
apartment rent. 
No sales tax on 
house payment. 
Guests pay sales tax 
on daily room rates. 
Occupants pay tax on 
utilities direct or 
through rent or lease 
payments. 
Renters pay the tax 
either through rent or 
direct to the utility. 
Residents pay the tax 
direct to the utility. 
Guests pay the tax 
through the room rates. 
Transient room 
tax (e) 
No sales tax is paid on Tax paid either direct to No tax, 
payments made for either utilities or through rent, 
renting or buying. 
No tax. 
No tax. 
No tax. 
Innkeeper tax (d) 
No tax. 
No tax. 
No tax. 
No tax. 
Guests pay through 
a tax on room rates. 
Guests pay the tax 
through room rates. 
Sources: 
(a) Residential property receives a 23% break in assessed values compared to nonresidential property due to passage of Proposition 1 
effective January 1, 1983. 
(b) Even though all people pay a 3% sales tax on goods, hotel/motel customers, by nature, are forced to eat out and, therefore, pay sales tax 
on 
labor for food preparation, serving, cleaning etc., while those who eat at home do not pay tax on the labor, etc. 
(c) 6% of utility usage. 
(d) 1% of room revenue. 
(e) Tax revenues are used to generate tourism which benefits the hotels and motels. These same taxes provide employment to city residents 
which enchances the SLC tax base through increases in virtually all categories of tax revenues. 
***:»» hwosi. 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
SALT U.rS OCUMTY. UTAH 
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•H.OtfOMHi.'sDLtY CLERK x 
ROGER F . C U T L E R ' OEPUTY CLERK 
S a l t Lake C i t y At torney 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendants 
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Te l ephone : 535-7788 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL ) 
CORPORATION, et al, ) 
VS. 
SALT 
Plaintiffs, j 
LAKE CITY, et al., ) 
Defendants. ) 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
TRI-ARC HOTEL ASSOCIATES' 
AND HOLIDAY INNS, INC.'S 
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. C 82-5220 
COMES NOW the defendants and object to the plaintiffs Tri-
Arc Hotel Associates and Holiday Inns., Inc.'s answers to 
defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories. 
The objection is made and based upon the fact that the said 
answers are evasive, unresponsive, and fail to fully set forth 
the discoverable information requested. 
DATED 
na^ : 
this J-f day of March ,_.lS8-3-* 
)GER F./CTJTLER ,«' 
i l t Lalce Ci 
RO
Sal l ity Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Defendants' Objection to Tri-Arc Hotels Associates' and Holiday 
Inn, Inc.'s Answer to Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories 
to Lon Rodney Kump, RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, 323 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Dorothy C. Pleshe, GREEN, CALLISTER & 
NEBEKER, 800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133; and 
to James M. Elegante, PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, 185 South State 
Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, by depositing 
the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this ^^l^^ day of 
March, 1983. 
cc71 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
OREM CITY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEE PYNE, 
Defendant. 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4039 
HEMQiymDUM PSC;ESIOK 
1
 and 
QRDE3 SZ P?$MIS?A1> 
Dee Pyne was charged with the crime of a misdemeanor in 
failing to pay a license tax to Orem City for a automobile business 
operated by him in Orem. He was convicted in the Orem City Court 
and has appealed his conviction to the District Court, claiming 
that the license ordinance is void as to him. 
The defendant's appeal entitles him to a trial de novo. He 
has entered anew a plea of not guilty, but has stipulated that 
during the time charged in the complaint he conducted a used car 
business and made sales subject to the sales tax imposed by the 
State of Utah; and that he has not paid any Orem City license tax. 
He now moves the court for a dismissal of the complaint, solely on 
the ground that the ordinance is invalid in imposing any tax on his 
used car sales business. 
Ordinance No. 26 of Orem City is the ordinance in question. 
It was enacted under the authority given to cities by Section 10-8-80, 
U.C.A. 1953, to tax businesses for revenue purposes; provided, 
however, "that all such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in 
respect to the class upon which they are imposed." The ordinance 
declares that its only purpose is to raise revenue. 
Section 3 of the ordinance levies a tax of 1/10 of 1% on the 
gross sales of businesses in Orem City engaged in selling tangible 
personal property, where such sales are subject to the Utah State 
sales tax, with a minimum of §6.25 per quarterryear and a maximum 
of $75.00 for the same period. ^* " OQ 
If the defendant's business is covered at all it is covered 
by this general Section, and not by any specific provision of the 
ordinance. 
The law presumes that the ordinance is valid until the con-
trary is shown. However, city licensing ordinances enacted for 
tax purposes must be strictly construed, and in cases of reasonable 
doubt, the construction should be against the government. Miller v. 
Standard Nut Margarine Co. 284 US 498, 52 S Ct 260, 263, 76 L Ed 422. 
Appeal of School District of City of Allentown (1952) 370 Pa 161, 
87 A 2d 480. 
The principal claim for invalidity is that the ordinance is 
discriminatory and arbitrary in its application to defendant's 
business. 
In Matthews v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P 303, at page 227 of 
the Utah Reports, our Supreme Court saidi "Neither the constitution 
nor the statute authorizes. . . ordinances, . . . to tax citizens 
arbitrarily and unjustly, by license which confers no privilege that 
was not previously enjoyed, and which has no view to regulation. 
Uniust and illegal discrimination between persona, in taxation, and 
the denial of equal justice, are within the prohibitions of the 
constitution of this state, and of the United States." 
As to what constitutes illegal and unjust discrimination in 
taxation, our Court has held: "Discrimination is the essence of 
classification and does violence to the constitution only when the 
basis upon which it is founded is unreasonable. In fixing the limits 
of the class, the legislative body has a wide discretion and this 
court may not concern itself with the wisdom or policy of the law. 
Our function is to determine whether an enactment operates equally 
upon all persons similarly situated. If it does then the discrimi-
nation is within permissible legislative limits. If it does not, 
then the discrimination would be without reasonable basis and the 
act does not meet the test of constitutionality." Slater v. salt 
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P 2d 153. 
30 
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This indicates that the classification by the legislative 
body must be reasonable and the tax must be applied with uniformity 
upon similar kinds of businesses and with substantial equality of 
the tax burden to all members of the same class. The imposition 
of taxes which are to a substantial degree unequal in their oper-
ation upon similar kinds of businesses is prohibited. 
What is the situation with respect to discrimination and 
reasonableness as this ordinance is written and may be applied and 
enforced? 
Section 1 of the ordinance lists 201 purported businesses 
for taxation and fixes a tax rate for each. A few of these names 
do not indicate businesses at all and are beyond the power of the 
City to tax for revenue purposes. Excluding these few, the remainder 
represent legitimate businesses, subject to taxation for revenue 
purposes. Even here, however, the lack of definitions renders 
the application of the ordinance and the tax uncertain, confusing, 
and perhaps inequitable. And since this section and the ordinance 
as a whole does not attempt to tax all business within the city, it 
may well be questioned as to any equality in spreading the tax burden. 
Section 3, standing alone, appears to be fair, reasonable, 
and definite in its application to all businesses generally in Orem 
City selling tangible personal property. Shis is a reasonable and 
proper classification fixed by the City. The difficulty arises 
when Section 1 is considered along with Section 3; because Section 1 
places several businesses, that would otherwise be covered by 
Section 3, on a flat annual fee basis that may be only one-twelfth 
as much as if they were on the gross sales basis, and taxable under 
Section 3. Why should one business selling tangible personal pro-
perty at retail be subjected to a tax of up to §300.00 per year, 
while other businesses (also selling tangible personal property at 
retail) such as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement plant, 
creamery, butcher shop, photography shop, or a dealer specializing in 
the sale of goods made in Japan, Bong Kong, Formosa, China, or India, 
doing the same volume of business, be taxed $25.00? _^ 
- 3 -
To establish by Section 3 of the ordinance a reasonable 
classification of businesses generally for taxation and fix a tax 
rate therefore based on gross sales with certain minimum and maximum 
amounts, and by another section of the same ordinance exclude from 
the operation of Section 3, certain businesses naturally falling 
within its classification, and apply to such excluded businesses a 
tax rate on a flat annual basis that can not possibly be more than 
the minimum for the unexcluded businesses is unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and discriminatory. Such exclusion assures to the excluded busi-
nesses a concession not accorded to other businesses similarly 
situated. 
It is clear that the ordinance is void as it applies to the 
defendant's business in this case, and the motion for dismissal is 
granted. 
This ruling is limited to the question presented by the 
defendant's motion. It is not within the province of the court at 
this time to pass on the validity of the entire ordinance. It may 
be valid as to some businesses and invalid as to others. As herein-
above stated, in a few instances there seems to be an entire absence 
of authority for the city to impose any tax at all for revenue purposes. 
Dated this 3rd day of August, 1964. 
Maurice Harding, Jud^e* 
" % - * » 

17-31-1. Authority of county commissioners to establish, 
promote and finance bureaus. 
In addition to the powers elsewhere conferred the board of county commis-
sioners is hereby authorized and empowered to establish, promote and finance 
recreational, tourist and convention bureaus. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, Cross-References. — Travel development, 
§ 1. Chapter 16 of Title 63. 
17-31-2. Imposition of transient room tax. 
They may raise revenue by the imposition of a transient room tax which 
shall not exceed three per cent of the rent for every occupancy of a suite, room 
or rooms on all persons, companies, corporations, or other like and similar 
persons, groups or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, ho-
tels, inns or like and similar public accomodations, and from time to time 
increase or decrease such levy as is necessary or desirable, and shall regulate 
the same by ordinance. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 2; 1975, ch. 114, referred to in this section, apparently means 
§ 1* the county commissioners. 
Meaning of ?<They". — The term 'They," 
17-31-3, Purpose of tax — Purchase or lease of facilities — 
Issuance of bonds. 
(1) A transient room tax as provided for in this act, may be imposed for the 
purposes of establishing, financing and promoting recreational, tourist and 
convention bureaus, 
(2) Counties receiving at least $250,000 annually from proceeds of the tran-
sient room tax may utilize not more than one-third of the tax for the purpose 
of acquiring, leasing, constructing, furnishing or maintaining convention 
meeting rooms, exhibit halls, visitor information centers, museums, and other 
facilities associated with the activities of said bureaus and for the acquisition 
or lease of land required for or related to these purposes. 
(3) The board of county commissioners may issue bonds under the provi-
sions of the Utah Municipal Bond Act to pay any costs incurred for the pur-
poses set forth in Subsection (2) of this section, and may pledge the entire 
proceeds of the transient room tax as provided in this act to the payment of 
principal, interest, premiums and necessary reserves for any such bonds, pro-
vided that no bonds shall be issued as provided in this act unless the average 
annual debt service, including provisions for reserves, on those bonds and on 
all outstanding bonds to which the transient room tax is pledged is less than 
one-third of the amounts derived from the proceeds of the transient room tax 
in the fiscal year of the county next preceding the date of issuance of those 
bonds, and provided further that when the proceeds of the transient room tax 
are not needed for payment of principal, interest, premiums and reserves on 
bonds issued as provided herein, those proceeds shall be utilized as provided in 
Subsections (1) and (2) of this section. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 3; 1979, ch. 68, The term "this act," referred to in Subsection 
§ 2. (3), means Laws 1979, ch. 68, which appears as 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this §§ 17-31-1 and 17-31-3. 
act," referred to in Suosection (1), means Laws Utah Municipal Bond Act. — See 
1965, ch. 35, which appears as §§ 17-31-1 to § n.14.22 and notes thereto. 
17-31-7. 
17-31-4. Reserve fund authorized — Use of collected 
funds. 
The board of county commissioners is hereby authorized and empowered to 
create a reserve fund and any funds collected but not expended during any 
fiscal year shall not revert to the general fund of the governing bodies but 
shall be retained in a special fund to be used in accordance with this act. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 4. graph of note under same catchline following 
Meaning of "this act". — See first para- § 17-31-3. 
17-31-5. "Transient" defined. 
For the purpose of this act the term "transient" is defined as any person who 
occupies any suite, room or rooms in a motel, hotel, motor court, inn or similar 
public accommodation for fewer than thirty consecutive days. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 5. graph of note under same catchline following 
Meaning of "this act". — See first para- § 17-31-3. 
17-31-6. Manner of collection of tax. 
Such tax shall be levied at the same time and collected in the same manner 
as is provided in Title 11, Chapter 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, "The Uni-
form Local Sales and Use Tax Law of Utah." 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 6. 
17-31-1. Board authorized to establish and promote bu-
reau and finance with transient room tax. 
(1) In addition to the powers elsewhere conferred the Board of County Com-
missioners may establish, promote, and finance recreational, tourist, and con-
vention bureaus. 
(2) Any Board of County Commissioners may raise revenue by the imposi-
tion of a transient room tax under § 59-12-301. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 1; 1979, ch. 68, 
§ 1; 1987, ch. 5, § 12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, designated 
the former provisions as set out in the bound 
volume as Subsection (1) and in that subsec-
tion substituted "may" for "is hereby autho-
17-31-2. Purpose of tax — Purchase or lease of facilities — 
Issuance of bonds. 
(1) A transient room tax provided for in § 59-12-301, may be imposed for 
the purposes of establishing, financing, and promoting recreational, tourist, 
and convention bureaus* 
(2) Counties receiving at least $250,000 annually from proceeds of the tran-
sient room tax may utilize not more than Vs of the tax for the purpose of 
acquiring, leasing, constructing, furnishing, or maintaining convention meet-
ing rooms, exhibit halls, visitor information centers, museums, and other 
facilities associated with the activities of said bureaus and for the acquisition 
or lease of land required for or related to these purposes. 
(3) The Board of County Commissioners may issue bonds under the provi-
sions of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, Chapter 14, Title 11, to pay any costs 
incurred for the purposes set forth in Subsection (2), and may pledge the 
entire proceeds of the transient room tax as provided in § 59-12-301 to the 
payment of principal, interest, premiums, and necessary reserves for any such 
bonds. No bonds may be issued as provided in this section unless the average 
annual debt service, including provisions for reserves, on those bonds and on 
all outstanding bonds to which the transient room tax is pledged is less than 
Va of the amounts derived from the proceeds of the transient room tax in the 
fiscal year of the county next preceding the date of issuance of those bonds. 
When the proceeds of the transient room tax are not needed for payment of 
principal, interest, premiums, and reserves on bonds issued as provided in this 
section, those proceeds shall be utilized as provided in Subsections (1) and (2). 
History: I*. 1965, ch. 35, § 3; 1979, ch. 68, changes in phraseology and punctuation 
§ 2; C. 1953, 17-31-3; renumbered by L. throughout the section. 
1987, ch. 5, § 14. Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 13 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered tion, which now appear as § 59-12-301. 
this section, which formerly appeared as Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
§ 17-31-3; in Subsection (1) and (3) substituted ch. 5, § 41 provides: 'This act has retrospective 
w§ 59-12-301" for "this act"; and made minor operation to January 1, 1987." 
rized and empowered to"; added, present Sub-
section (2); and made minor changes in phrase-
ology and punctuation. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
17-31-3. Reserve fund authorized — Use of collected 
funds. 
The Board of County Commissioners may create a reserve fund and any 
funds collected but not expended during any fiscal year shall not revert to the 
general fund of the governing bodies but shall be retained in a special fund to 
be used in accordance with §§ 17-31-1 through 17-31-5. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 4; C. 1953, 
17-31-4; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 17-31-4; substituted "§§ 17-31-1 through 
17-31-5" for "this act"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 35, § 5; C. 1953, 
17-31-5; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 16. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 17-31-5; substituted "§§ 17-31-1 through 
17-31-5" for "this act"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
History? L- 1965, ch. 35, § 7; C. 1953, 
17-31-7; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 18. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 17-31-7; substituted "§§ 17-31-1 through 
17-31-5" for "this act"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
17-31-6. Renumbered. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section was re-
numbered as § 59-12-302 by Laws 1987, ch. 5, 
§ 17. 
17-31-7. Renumbered. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section was re-
numbered as § 17-31-5 by Laws 1987, ch. 5, 
§ 18. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 14 
renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
tion, which now appear as § 17-31-2. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
Compiler's Notes. —Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 15 
renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
tion, which now appear as § 17-31-3. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 5, § 16 
renumbered the former provisions of this sec-
tion, which now appear as § 17-31-4. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 5, § 41 provides: "This act has retrospective 
operation to January 1, 1987." 
17-31-4. "Transient" defined. 
For the purpose of §§ 17-31-1 through 17-31-5 "transient" means any per-
son who occupies any suite, room, or rooms in a motel, hotel, motor court, inn, 
or similar public accommodation for fewer than 30 consecutive days. 
17-31-5. General authority and powers of county commis-
sioners. 
The Board of County Commissioners may do and perform any and all other 
acts and things necessary, convenient, desirable, or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of §§ 17-31-1 through 17-31-5. 
THE UNIFORM LOCAL SALES AND USE TAX ACT 
59-12-201. Short title. 
This part shall be known as "The Local Sales and Use Tax Act." 
History; L. 1987, ch. 5, § 2. 
59-12-202. Purpose and intent. 
It is the purpose of this part to provide the counties, cities, and towns of the 
state with an added source of revenue and to thereby assist them to meet their 
growing financial needs. It is the legislative intent that this added revenue be 
used to the greatest possible extent by the counties, cities, and towns to fi-
nance their capital outlay requirements and to service their bonded indebted-
ness. 
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 3. 
59-12-203. County, city and town may levy tax — Excep-
tion — Contracts pursuant to Interlocal Co-oper-
ation Ac t 
Any county, city, or town may levy a sales and use tax under this part. Any 
county, city, or town which elects to levy such sales and use tax may enter 
into agreements authorized by Chapter 13, Title 11, the Interlocal Coopera-
tion Act, and may use any or all of the revenues derived from the imposition of 
such tax for the mutual benefit of local governments which elect to contract 
with one another pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act. 
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 4. 
59-12-204. Sales tax provisions required in county sales 
and use tax ordinance — Additional county or 
municipal taxes authorized. 
(1) The tax ordinance adopted pursuant to this part shall impose a tax upon 
those items listed in § 59-12-103. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(2), such tax ordinance shall 
include a provision imposing a tax upon every retail sale of items listed in 
§ 59-12-103 made within a county including areas contained within the cities 
and towns thereof at the rate of ZU% or any fractional part of such 2U% of the 
purchase price paid or charged. 
(3) In addition to the 3U% or any fractional part of such 3A% tax authorized 
by this section, any county, city, or town within a transit district organized 
under Chapter 20, Title 11, may impose a sales and use tax of V4of 1% to fund 
a public transportation system only if the governing body of the county, city, 
or town by resolution, submits the proposal to all the qualified voters within 
the county, city, or town for approval at a general or special election con-
ducted in the manner provided by statute. Notice of any such election shall be 
given by the county, city, or town governing body 15 days in advance in the 
manner prescribed by statute. If a majority of the voters voting in such elec-
tion approve the proposal, it shall become effective on the date provided by the 
county, city, or town governing body. This subsection may not be construed to 
require an election in jurisdictions where voters have previously approved a 
transit district sales or use tax. 
(4) Such tax ordinance shall include provisions substantially the same as 
those contained in Part 1, Chapter 12, Title 59, insofar as they relate to sales 
or use tax, except that the name of the county as the taxing agency shall be 
substituted for that of the state where necessary for the purpose of this part 
and that an additional license is not required if one has been or is issued 
under § 59-12-106. 
(5) Such tax ordinance shall include a provision that the county shall con-
tract, prior to the effective date of the ordinance, with the commission to 
perform all functions incident to the administration or operation of the ordi-
nance. 
(6) Such tax ordinance shall include a provision that the sale, storage, use, 
or other consumption of tangible personal property, the purchase price or the 
cost of which has been subject to sales or use tax under a sales and use tax 
ordinance enacted in accordance with this part by any county, city, or town in 
any other county in this state, shall be exempt from the tax due under this 
ordinance. 
(7) Such tax ordinance shall include a provision that any person subject to 
the provisions of a city or town sales and use tax shall be exempt from the 
county sales and use tax if the city or town sales and use tax is levied under 
an ordinance including provisions in substance as follows: 
(a) a provision imposing a tax upon every retail sale of items listed in 
§ 59-12-103 made within the city or town at the rate imposed by the 
county in which it is situated pursuant to Subsection (2); 
(b) provisions substantially the same as those contained in Part 1, 
Chapter 12, Title 59, insofar as they relate to sales and use taxes, except 
that the name of the city or town as the taxing agency shall be substi-
tuted for that of the state where necessary for the purposes of this part; 
(c) a provision that the city or town shall contract prior to the effective 
date of the city or town sales and use tax ordinance with the commission 
to perform all functions incident to the administration or operation of the 
sales and use tax ordinance of the city or town; 
(d) a provision that the sale, storage, use, or other consumption of tan-
gible personal property, the gross receipts from the sale of or the cost of 
which has been subject to sales or use tax under a sales and use tax 
ordinance enacted in accordance with this part by any county other than 
the county in which the city or town is located, or city or town in this 
state, shall be exempt from the tax; and 
(e) a provision that the amount of any tax paid under Part 1, Chapter 
12, Title 59 shall not be included as a part of the purchase price paid or 
charged for a taxable item hereunder. 
(8) (a) In addition to the other taxes provided for, a city or town in which 
the transient room capacity equals or exceeds the permanent census pop-
ulation may impose a sales tax of up to 1% subject to exemptions provided 
for in § 59-12-104, and shall exempt from that additional tax, wholesale 
sales and sales of single items for which consideration paid is $2,500 or 
more. 
(b) An amount equal to the total of any costs incurred by the state in 
connection with the implementation of Subsection (a) which exceed, in 
any year, the revenues received by the state from its collection fees re-
ceived in connection with the implementation of Subsection (a) shall be 
paid over to the state General Fund by the cities and towns which impose 
the tax provided for in Subsection (a). Payment costs shall be allocated 
proportionally among those cities and towns according to the amount of 
revenue the respective cities and towns generate in that year through 
imposition of that tax. 
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 5. 
TRANSIENT ROOM TAX 
59-12-301. Transient room tax — Rate, 
Any Board of County Commissioners may raise revenue by the imposition 
of a transient room tax. This tax may not exceed 3% of the rent for every 
occupancy of a suite, room, or rooms on ail persons, companies, corporations, 
or other like and similar persons, groups, or organizations doing business as 
motor courts, motels, hotels, inns, or like and similar public accommodations. 
Any Board of County Commissioners may, from time to .time, increase or 
decrease such transient room tax as necessary or desirable, and shall regulate 
the same by ordinance. 
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § VT 
59-12-302. Manner of collection of tax. 
The transient room tax shall be levied at the same time and collected in the 
same manner as is provided in Part 2, Chapter 12, Title 59. 
History: L. 1987, ch. 5, § 17. 
